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ABSTRACT 
The thesis addresses Romania’s experiences with defense reform and the 
development of democratic civil-military relations (CMR) since the collapse of 
communism in December 1989.  
The purpose of the thesis is to identify relevant qualitative and quantitative 
indicators to measure the progress of the Romanian political and military authorities in 
implementing the defense reform initiatives, with a special focus on the CMR trinity 
(civilian democratic control over the armed forces, defense efficiency, and military 
effectiveness).  
The thesis argues that civilian democratic control over the armed forces was the 
key priority during the early stages of defense reform, given the challenges posed by the 
transition to democracy. During this period, attention was focused on establishing and 
enforcing the democratic constitutional and legal framework, re-defining the roles and 
missions of the armed forces, and restructuring of the military. Once these objectives 
were achieved, the defense reform allowed for finding appropriate strategies and policies 
to improving defense efficiency and military effectiveness. Consistent progress has been 
made alongside these aspects of CMR, especially since the 2000s, when national efforts 
were more convincing, and the NATO assistance for further accession were more 
targeted.  
The success of Romania’s experiences with defense reform is demonstrated by 
revisiting three areas of defense policies: the defense planning, programming and 
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The thesis addresses Romania’s civil-military experiences with defense reform 
since the collapse of communism in December 1989. It draws on the record of the 
Romanian Ministry of Defense and the armed forces in the planning and implementation 
of defense reform in the recent past. Its focus is on civilian democratic control over the 
Armed Forces, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness.1  
The questions that the thesis seeks to answer are: Could we draw on specific 
qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the progress of defense reform and the 
transformation of civil-military relations? What are the key achievements and failures 
registered by the Romanian authorities in designing and implementing successive 
generations of defense reform throughout sixteen years of consolidating democracy and 
enforcing healthy civil-military relations? Was there a certain logic in establishing 
different priorities for Romania’s defense reform (i.e., enforcing civilian control over the 
armed forces was the primary objective during the early 1990s, while increasing 
efficiency and effectiveness reached the agenda only during the latter stages of defense 
reform)? These measures of success will be applied to the planning, programming and 
budgeting system (PPBS); human resources management; and the modernization of 
military equipment – the three fields of defense policy seen as essential for a 
comprehensive assessment of progress alongside the civil-military relations trinity. 
This thesis will examine Romanian defense reform both sequentially and 
thematically. First, the sequential dimension examines the various phases, or 
                                                 
1 This is a framework suggested in Bruneau, Thomas and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a 
Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization Vol. 13, Nr. 5 
(December 2006), 776-90. Borrowing from the well-known “Trinity” of Clausewitz, they posit these three 
aspects as a “trinity” of civil-military relations. 
 2
“generations,” seen in the evolution of Romanian defense reform:2 a) the first generation 
lasted between December 1989 and the NATO Summit held in Madrid in 1997; b) the 
second generation occurred between 1997 and Romania’s accession to NATO; and c) the 
last generation is still on-going. This approach has been employed by such donor 
agencies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the early 
stages of Romanian administrative reforms. This periodization also helps to track the 
commitment of Romanian political and military authorities to meeting the interoperability 
criteria for NATO integration in 2004, and subsequently to the European Union (EU), of 
which Romania became a full member state in January 2007.  
In the second instance, thematically this thesis examines early efforts to re-
establish the rule of law and the legitimacy of state institutions, and to enforce democracy 
and sustainable development. Reform of Romania’s defense also sought to redefine the 
roles and missions of the armed forces to make them compatible with democratic 
institutions. Establishing civilian democratic control over the military required the 
government to govern effectively with democratic transparency and accountability.3 This 
goal required democratic oversight over defense planning and budgeting, and the re-
professionalization of the armed forces. All these goals emerged as important objectives 
of Romanian defense reform during the early 1990s. The second and third generations of 
defense reform lasted from 1998 until Romania’s accession to NATO in April 2004. This 
period witnessed more specific reforms that focused on defense efficiency and military 
effectiveness. The success of these reforms can be measured by progress in the defense 
planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS); the human resources management 
system; and the modernization of military equipment. 
                                                 
2 Chris Smith uses the concept of “first and second generation of conditionality” (Conflict and 
Security Development. 1(1)/2001). The concept of “generations of reforms” has been used as such in the 
work of many scholars researching defense reform in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. George C. Maior 
and Sebastian Huluban, “From Hardware to Software Reforms in Romania’s Civil-Military Relations. The 
Policies of Personnel Management,” Baltic Defence Review No. 8. Vol. 2/2002. Ionel Nicu Sava, Western 
(NATO/PfP) Assistance to Build Democratic Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe. The case of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. Final Report, the Manfred Wörner Fellowship 2001-2002, Bucharest, 
November 2002), Timothy Edmunds, “NATO and its New Members,” Survival 45, no. 3 (2003).  
3 Civilian democratic control over the armed forces is the first and most “privileged” dimension of the 
civil-military trinity, according to Bruneau and Trinkunas (Op. cit., 778). 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of the research operates on the theoretical and the practical levels. 
The theoretical approach proposed by the thesis attempts to identify relevant indicators 
for measuring progress with respect to each of the dimensions of the civil-military 
relations trinity. It addresses the developments with defense reform through the lenses of 
civilian control over the armed forces, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness. On 
the practical level, this thesis draws on the lessons learned during successive generations 
of reform in Romania. This analysis provides a context and a guide to dealing with 
challenges posed by ever shrinking defense budgets, as in today’s Romania. The policy 
recommendations that conclude the thesis may prove extremely valuable for politicians 
involved in making decisions regarding defense budgeting, policy-makers, and the civil 
servants and officers who must implement the decisions made regarding the management 
of defense resources. Finding appropriate strategies to increase defense efficiency and 
military effectiveness always brings about the necessity of strategic planning and careful 
spending of defense resources (people, money, and equipment). This applies equally 
when setting the agenda for future defense reform and when addressing the inherent 
challenges posed by the defense reform’ implementation phase. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The conceptual framework proposed by the thesis builds on the topical approach 
suggested by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas in their recent work on the civil-
military relations trinity in consolidating democracies.4 Such themes take into account 
classical theories about civilian control of the military, re-shaping the roles and missions 
of the armed forces in a democracy, the professionalization of the armed forces and an 
all-volunteer force. But modern approaches to performance management at the level of 
defense bureaucracy, efficiency in procurement decision-making and contracting, and the 
“civilianization” of the military institution are also to be addressed, given the identified 
indicators for measuring progress in civil-military relations. In the process, it builds  
 
                                                 
4 Bruneau and Trinkunas, Ibid. 
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primarily on the contributions of scholars from the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF).5  
The thesis also reviews the concepts of the classical theory on civil-military 
relations and such related themes as civilian democratic control over the armed forces 
forces, and military professionalism, as introduced by Samuel Huntington and Morris 
Janowitz.6  Some of the issues addressed in conjunction with democratic civilian control 
over the military, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness touch upon the structural 
model introduced by Michael Desch,7  or the “post-modern” military approach embraced 
by liberal democracies of the West.  This approach recommends a paradigm of “all all-
volunteer forces, smaller armed formations, flexible, fully interoperable, highly mobile 
and state-of-the-art equipped,” as argued by Charles Moskos, believed by some scholars 
to be one of the most influential military sociologists of the last decade.8 
Taking into account that, in general, “defense reforms are intended to bring about 
changes in the military establishment, to achieve greater oversight and control, greater 
effectiveness and/or greater efficiencies in spending” as pointed out by Bruneau and 
Trinkunas in the introductory chapter of a forthcoming book,9 the thesis starts with some 
conceptual clarifications of “defense reform,” but also with some working definitions of 
“defense efficiency” and “military effectiveness.”  These are the two dimensions of the 
                                                 
5 Most important and recently published is: Bruneau, Thomas and Scott D. Tollefson, eds. Who 
Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2006). Also important is the recent work of scholars from DCAF: Born, Hans, Marina Caparini, Karl 
Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhlmann, eds. Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and 
International Change. (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
6 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). The theme is revisited by Huntington 
decades later – “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” Journal of Democracy 6(4)/1995, 9-17. See also: 
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1960) 
and Peter Feaver, “The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of Civilian 
Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23(2) (1996), 149-78. 
7 Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).  
8 Ionel Nicu Sava, “Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Eastern 
Europe”, Research paper, G-125, Conflict Studies Research Centre. (Surrey, England: Defense Academy 
of the United Kingdom, August 2003), 9-10. 
9 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas. “Global Trends and their impact on Civil-Military 
Relations,” draft chapter of a forthcoming book. Material provided by the author. 
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civil-military trinity that are usually neglected by such research. Thus, the first section of 
the thesis builds on the research of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF),10 and on the contribution of Peter Drucker to the science of 
management and organizational analysis.11 The theoretical debate cannot ignore the issue 
of efficiency in defense procurement and contracting,12 as embraced by the military 
bureaucracy, or the incentives proposed to cost-savings in the case of the concept of an 
all-volunteer force,13 as opposed to the conscription armies. More managerial-like 
approaches to performance management are suggested by on-going research conducted at 
the level of different branches of the United States Armed Forces.14 
A recent study dedicated to intelligence reforms, democracy, and effectiveness by 
Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau was also insightful with regards to the attempt to 
identify possible indicators associated to the civil-military relations trinity in a 
democratic regime. In this respect, the three questions that the authors recommend to be 
answered (which are also consistent with the present analysis) are as follows: “1) Do 
electorally and constitutionally accountable civilian officials control the military? 2) Do 
they handle it in such a way that it can be effective at achieving its roles and missions 
from war fighting and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or emergency-response work? 3) 
                                                 
10 A series of working papers, occasional papers or proceedings of international workshops organized 
by DCAF were published by authors such as Theodor Winkler – Managing Change. The Reform and 
Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order, DCAF Occasional Paper No. 1 
(October 2002). See also Marina Caparini, The Relevance of Democratic Control of the Security Sector. 
DCAF Working Paper Series, Geneva: DCAF No. 24 (July 2002).  
11 Using the definitions proposed by Peter Drucker (People and Performance: The Best of Peter 
Drucker on Management. (New York: Harper's College Press, 1977: 33), according to whom “Efficiency is 
concerned with doing things right.” while “effectiveness is doing the right things,” one can assert that 
achieving the military effectiveness depends on the established Objective Force, the forces deployed in 
theatre, or the professionalization of the Armed Forces, while on the other hand, defense efficiency is 
achieved by generating a given output using fewer resources (i.e., people, money, equipment).  
12 For relevant debates during the 1960s see Frederick T. Moore, “Efficiency and Public Policy in 
Defense Procurement”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 29, No. 1, Government Contracts: Part I, 
(Winter, 1964), 3-18. 
13 William P. Snyder, and Peter Davis, “Efficiency and Usefulness in Policy Research: the Case of 
All-Volunteer Force”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Jan.-Feb., 1981), 34-46. 
14 The United States Navy, Navy Performance Excellence Guidebook, 2006, 
http://usn.hq.navy.mil/SeaEnterprise, (accessed August 12, 2006). 
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Is all this being accomplished with maximum efficiency?”15 Given the above, the 
proposed analysis takes into account the objectives of defense reform at different stages, 
the constitutional and legislative changes to put them into place, and the structural 
arrangements and defense policies drafted by the Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
to enforce them. Other authors like Richard Kohn and Michael Desch argue that the 
challenges of civilian democratic control are ultimately tested by “whether civilians can 
exercise supremacy in military policy and decision-making,”16 an issue that leads to a 
more delicate problem, namely the competence and experience of civilian leaders or the 
kind of control mechanisms civilians are likely to adopt.  
To conclude, some ingredients that enable civilian control over the military, 
which are also relevant for the thesis, are as follows: the existence of democratic 
governance and the rule of law, civil liberty, a stable method for peaceful succession in 
power, workable practices for electing officials, accountability to public institutions, 
effective countervailing power and a military tradition committed to neutrality.17 
After establishing the conceptual framework for analyzing defense reform and the 
dimensions of civil-military relations, the first part of the thesis proposes a set of relevant 
indicators for each of the elements of the trinity.  
The following section of the thesis builds on some of the most relevant legacies of 
communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which explain the 
common challenges and patterns of development in regards to defense reform and civil-
military relations in the aftermath of the Cold War. This section provides a critical 
                                                 
15 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, “Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness,” 
Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy and The John Hopkins University Press, Vol. 
17, No. 3 (July 2006), 31.  
16 Richard Kohn. An essay on Civilian Control of the Military, 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html. (accessed January, 2006). See also 
Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 2001, 5. 
17 Many of these indicators were addressed by Professor Edwin Micewski, NS3025 – Introduction to 
Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, NSA Department, Course notes, 
(Winter 2006). See also Kohn (1997), 145-46. 
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analysis of the defense reform reviews and scholarly materials published by professionals 
employed by NATO advisory groups18 or by the staff of the DCAF.19  
The third section provides a potential framework for net assessment of Romania’s 
approach to defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution. Building on the 
approach of political and military authorities to issues that pertain to civil-military 
relations, the thesis draws extensively on the contribution of Romanian decision-makers 
involved in establishing and implementing the defense reform objectives, policies and 
strategies.20 The work of Larry Watts on the issue has also been extremely valuable, 
given the experience and perspective of the author, who had the chance to be both an 
observer and a contributor to Romania’s reforms in defense and security.21 To better 
understand the progress of defense reform, but also the developments in civil-military 
relations registered by the Romanian Ministry of Defense, a more detailed, field-related 
analysis is provided. It will account of major accomplishments, but also failures that 
occurred in various areas of defense policy (the PPBS, human resources management, 
and the modernization of equipment). Scholarly articles published by Romanian policy-
makers, but also strategy papers issued by expert structures of the Romanian MoD 
provided resourceful insights in accomplishing this task. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning the chapter on the professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces 
                                                 
18 See, for instance, the individual or group contributions of authors such as Chris Donnely, Andrew 
Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, many of them published in NATO Review and other 
relevant publications on defense and security analyses. A thorough analysis is also proposed by Jeffrey 
Simon and Hans Binnendijk, “Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July 1997 Summit,” 
Strategic Forum, National Defense University, No. 101 (Feb. 1997),  
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF101/forum101.html (accessed Dec. 12, 2006). 
19Anthony Forster, T. Edmunds, and A. Cottey, The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist 
Europe. Building Professional Armed Forces. (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002). 
Forster, Antony. New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agendas. DCAF Working Paper Series, 
No. 83, (Geneva: DCAF, August 2002). Fred Schreier and M. Caparini. Privatizing Security: Law, Practice 
and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies, DCAF Organizational Paper no. 6 (Geneva: 
DCAF, March 2005). 
20 See the collection of materials published by DCAF: Defense and Security Sector Governance and 
Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. Romania – A Self-Assessment Study. (Geneva: 
DCAF, 2003). 
21 Serving as a security sector reform consultant to the Romanian Presidency under many 
administrations, Larry Watts is the champion of the Romanian defense reform reviews, as addressed by the 
international political and military community.  
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published by Marian Zulean in a book edited by Forster et al.22 An article published by 
the same author in the spring of 2004 provides a fair overview of the constitutional and 
legal provisions regarding the Romanian military organization in the semi-presidential 
regime,23 and also a key indicator of civilian control of the armed forces. The work of 
George Cristian Maior24 and Mihaela Matei also proved to be of great value. Building on 
the paradigm of civil-military relations, the authors observe that while “defense planning 
in military establishment… evolved toward an artificial separation of civilian and 
military responsibilities,” the joint civil-military efforts to establish the first two National 
Security Strategies (issued in 2001 and 2004) and two White Papers of Security and 
National Defense argue for “extended limits of civilian expertise in order to address areas 
considered exclusively military.”25  
The above lead us to a comprehensive analysis that is not exclusively dedicated to 
civilian control, but also to the other two dimensions of civil-military relations, defense 
efficiency and military effectiveness.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Given the argument of the thesis and the research questions, the case study (on 
Romania’s defense reform) and the comparative analysis (among countries in the CEE 
region) are the essential methods to be used. On the other hand, policy analysis and 
policy recommendations would prevail in the attempt to review the developments 
registered in the three areas of expertise (the PPBS, human resource management system, 
and the modernization of equipment and procurement reform). 
                                                 
22 Marian Zulean, “Professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces,” in Forster et al. The 
Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe (Basinstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 
2002). 
23 See M. Zulean “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe.” 
Mediterranean Quarterly (Spring 2004), 62-3. 
24 George Cristian Maior was the State Secretary for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration 
Department (2000-2004). A diplomat by profession, Maior was appointed a Senator for the Social-
Democrats, and as of late 2006, he was appointed in as Director of the Romanian Intelligence Agency. 
25 George Maior and Mihaela Matei. “Bridging the Gap in Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern 
Europe: Romania’s Defense-Planning Case,” Mediterranean Quarterly, (Spring 2003): 65, 73. 
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To a large extent, both the comparative analysis and the case study build on a 
variety of primary and secondary sources to present the cases and support the hypothesis. 
These include a critical analysis of constitutional and legal provisions, policy and strategy 
papers elaborated by various expert structures of the Romanian Ministry of Defense, and 
also selected interviews and press conferences conducted by former and current decision-
makers, namely political figures or military experts.  
Building on the proposed conceptual framework and the evidence regarding 
Romania’s progress against qualitative and quantitative indicators of the civil-military 
trinity, the analysis provides an aggregate assessment of the research findings relative to 
major achievements and failures alongside the three selected fields of activity chosen for 
revisiting the defense reform. Using a one-to-five assessment scale (1 being the 
minimum, and 5 representing the maximum), the thesis concludes with an evaluation that 
attempts to correlate the founding principles of democratic civilian control, military 
effectiveness, and defense efficiency – on the one hand – with the progress registered by 
the Romanian MoD in particular fields of defense reform – on the other hand. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Four major sections comprise the thesis. After the introductory chapter, the first 
part of the thesis is devoted to conceptual clarifications and drawing a framework of 
analysis. Several approaches to ‘defense reform’ versus ‘defense transformation,’ as well 
as current debates on defining the dimensions of the civil-military relations trinity 
(civilian control over the military, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness) will be 
considered. This approach will help us to identify key qualitative and quantitative 
indicators for measuring progress with defense reform and civil-military relations. These 
indicators will constitute the framework for analysis for further review of progresses 
registered in civil-military relations by countries of Central and Eastern Europe, while 
special attention will be paid to the Romanian case study.  
The following section proposes a comparative analysis of the state of affairs in 
civil-military relations as encountered by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) during communism, with a focus on the last years, and the period since the historic 
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changes of 1989. Understandably, special attention will be given to characteristics that 
are specific to the Romanian case in this respect.  
Then, the study builds on more detailed analysis of Romania’s experiences with 
defense reform throughout sixteen years of consolidating democracy. It takes account of 
the objectives, strategies, and policies designed to reach the national priorities, as well as 
the outcomes of defense reform initiatives alongside three generations of defense reform. 
The role played by various internal and external actors in pursuing defense reform and 
enhancing civil-military relations will be underlined throughout the proposed analysis. A 
sub-section of the thesis applies the proposed sets of indicators for the civil-military 
relations trinity, to field-related progress in the following areas of defense policy: the 
PPBS, human resources management, and the modernization of military equipment and 
defense procurement.  
The thesis concludes by providing an overall assessment of the achievements 
made by the Romanian MoD in addressing the civil-military relations trinity and the 
attached set of indicators regarding various elements of the approach (civilian control 
over the military, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness). Building on the above, 
some policy recommendations for further improvement of the civil-military trinity will 
finalize the proposed analysis. They should be valid not only for the Romanian political 
and military authorities, but also for other decision-makers, policy-designers, and 
scholars investigating relevant indicators for civilian control, defense efficiency, and 





II. DEFENSE REFORM AND THE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS VIEWED AS A TRINITY: 
SEARCHING FOR INDICATORS   
A. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
There is no clear-cut distinction between defense reform, military transformation 
and the modernization of the armed forces. In the majority of cases, both colloquially and 
in the scholarly literature, and not only when it comes to the defense and security sector, 
the terms are used interchangeably. Equally, civil-military relations are sometimes seen 
as being synonymous with democratic civilian control of the military, ignoring the other 
two dimensions that a thorough analysis of the trinity presupposes. However, as this 
section will demonstrate, a sizable difference exists among these concepts, and this 
difference refers to the nature and the degree of change and innovation involved in each 
of the above. Underlining the conceptual differences proves essential for the goal of the 
research, namely measuring progress of Romania’s defense reform, with particular 
attention to civil-military relations. That is because identifying relevant indicators to 
evaluate civilian democratic control, defense efficiency and military effectiveness are 
pivotal for the purpose of the thesis, namely to create a framework for analysis of civil-
military relations. It will also prove essential for the assessment of Romania’s defense 
reform throughout the transition to democracy, and will contribute to further research 
regarding improvements on each of the dimensions of civil-military relations. 
1. ‘Defense Reform’ Versus ‘Defense Transformation’ 
When it comes to the applicability of such terms as ‘reform’, ‘transformation’ and 
‘modernization’ to national defense and security, the debate is open to addressing 
complex issues like downsizing and restructuring of the defense bureaucracy; changing 
the military doctrine and defense policy – reflected in the national security strategy, in 
most cases; or introducing innovations in military technology, such as the so-called 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which has become popular in recent years.  
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Nevertheless, differences among countries and their military power are visible 
when comparing the magnitude of transformational processes and the ways in which they 
pursue changes, and how the various stages are reached, in terms of civil-military 
relations. The Western democracies took the lead in establishing the standards of defense 
reform initiatives and transformation processes, and this trend became apparent 
especially since the end of World War II. Not surprisingly, beyond the ups and downs 
registered in respect to civil-military relations, the United States was the champion of 
defense transformation and successes registered in implementing ambitious defense 
reform initiatives, many of them with a view to improving performance in defense 
management. That is because consolidated democracies enjoy a rich and relatively long 
history in terms of democratic civil-military relations, but also because they possess the 
economic means to implement the ambitious and costly objectives of defense reform 
initiatives, many of them requiring military transformation and a culture of innovation. 
But what exactly does “military transformation”– a term that entered into common use in 
the late 1990s – mean, and how does it differ from “defense reform”? Are there 
differences between the objectives or the degree of change between the two concepts? 
And if the answer is yes, which term would better describe the progress made by the 
young democracies of CEE, and especially by Romania? Let us first proceed with some 
functional definitions.  
A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on the United States’ 
defense transformation defines the concept of ‘defense transformation’ as a “largescale, 
discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of 
operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization that are prompted by 
significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different international 
security challenges.”26 
 Reviewing some of the key attempts in the American military literature to define 
the concept of ‘transformation,’ which refers primarily to technological advance, the 
RMA, or “making the U.S. military forces more expeditionary,” Ronald O’Rourke, the 
                                                 
26 Ronald O’Rourke, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of 
Congress, Updated January 23, 2007, p. 2. (This is the most recent version of the CRS Report on the issue). 
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author of the CRS Report stresses the fact that all these attempts are, in fact, just some 
descriptions of the transformation strategy, or “prescriptions for how the United Stated 
military forces should be transformed.”27 
To return to the functional definition proposed, it is essential to illustrate the 
understanding that lies behind the American concept of ‘defense transformation.’ Thus, 
some of the essential shifts that are envisioned by the U.S. Department of Defense and 
reflect the departmental view on the objectives of ‘defense transformation’ can be 
summarized as follows: “From a peacetime tempo – to a wartime sense of urgency; from 
single-focused threats – to multiple, complex challenges; …from under-resourced, 
standby forces (hollow units) – to fully-equipped and fully-manned forces (combat ready 
units) etc.,” as O’Rourke illustrates.28 In other words, the nature, efficiency and the 
tempo of the changes are addressed at highest standards when it comes to the defense 
transformation process. 
The author of the CRS Report recognizes the difficulties that occur in any attempt 
to calculate the potential cost of defense transformation. As such rationales refer to the 
“cost” element, which is essential in measuring defense efficiency and military 
effectiveness, such motives are also relevant for our attempt to identify key indicators of 
civil-military relations and progress with defense reform. According to O’Rourke, among 
the motives that justify the difficulty in measuring the costs of defense transformation, 
the following are listed:  
a) opinions differ on what kinds of planned changes for DoD qualify as 
transformational, and which do not; b) developing and acquiring new 
weapons and equipment … can be very expensive, but the cost of this can 
be offset, perhaps substantially or even completely, by reducing or 
canceling the development and procurement of non-transformational 
weapons and equipment that would no longer be needed; ...c) 
implementing transformational changes in an organization can also cost 
                                                 
27 Ronald O’Rourke, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of 
Congress, Updated January 23, 2007, p. 2. (This is the most recent version of the CRS Report on the issue). 
3. 
28 Ibid., 6-7. To support his argument, the author cites the Report on the 2005 Quadrennial Review, 
submitted to the U.S. Congress on February 6, 2006. 
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money, but these costs might similarly be offset by the reduced recurring 
cost of maintaining the new forms of organization; etc…29  
Building on an article by Geoff Fein published in Defense Daily in January 
2006,30 O’Rourke concludes that “Instilling a culture of innovation among DoD 
personnel will be critical to implementing transformation.”31 This will be one of the 
features to be observed by the political and military stakeholders involved in managing 
defense reform during the latter stages of Romania’s defense reform, when introducing 
innovations became affordable. 
But when addressing the dramatic changes that occurred in Central and Eastern 
Europe during the 1990s, the term ‘defense reform’ or the broader concept of ‘security 
sector reform’32 (SSR) appears to be preferred, as a review of literature demonstrates. 
However, there are authors that choose the term ‘transformation’ to emphasize the 
magnitude of shifts and innovations done by the armed forces, although the issues 
covered by their academic debate are the same. Thus, among the themes discussed are the 
following: a) the new operational concepts; b) military capabilities; c) defense resource 
management, including human resources management; d) the concept of Objective Force; 
and e) the equipment modernization program.33    
A comprehensive spectrum of issues covered by defense reform is provided in the 
introductory section of a report entitled “Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status 
and Challenges,” which was elaborated by a group of authors from the U.S. General 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 11. 
30 Geoff Fein, “Intellectual, Cultural Change Needed for Transformation, Official Says,” Defense 
Daily (January 24, 2006).  
31 O’Rourke, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
for Congress (Updated 23 January 2007), 22. 
32 See Theodore Winkler, “Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security 
Sector and International Order,” Occassional Paper No. 1, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (October 2002). A more detailed analysis to SSR, is provided by Born, Fluri, and Lunn 
(Eds.), Oversight and Guidance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its reform. A 
Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector, 
(Brussels/Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2003). 
33 Although the issues covered are similar, there are equally American scholars, as well as Europeans 
(e.g. Chris Donnelly’s work dedicated to analyzing ‘defense transformation’ in CEE). One of the Romanian 
scholars who use the concept of ‘defense transformation’ to emphasize the dramatic changes operated by 
the institution is Cornel Pavel (Romanian Armed Forces Transformation, Strategy Research Project, U.S. 
Army War College, Carlistle Barracks, PA, 2002). 
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Accounting Office (GAO) in April 1999. As emphasized by the report, the four major 
pillars around which any debate on the defense reform initiative is built, which also 
mirror Romania’s priorities for reforms through successive generations of reforms are as 
follows: a) reengineering defense business and support functions, primarily by adopting 
and applying the private sector’s best practices; b) reorganizing and reducing the size of 
DoD headquarters elements and defense agencies; c) expanding the use of competitive 
sourcing to open DoD’s commercial activities to competition from the private sector; and 
d) conducting two additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds and 
eliminating other facilities that are no longer needed and/or drain resources.” 34 
In his work dedicated to security sector reform, Ambassador Theodor Winkler, 
the director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 
defines the ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) as a ‘constant challenge,’ a process that 
consists of five elements, which are further addressed.  
First, the reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to 
democratic principles and the needs of state and society. Secondly, the 
starting point is a broad view of the term “security,” including military, 
societal, economic and environmental security risks. Thirdly, the reforms 
include all services: military, police, intelligence agencies, state security, 
paramilitary organizations, and border guards. Fourthly, security sector 
reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous process; it is not a goal in 
itself, but aims at providing security both to the state and to its citizens. 
Fifthly, the reforms concern both the organization of the security sector 
(legal framework, structure of institutions, division of labor) and the 
human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating services 
staffed with professionals.35  
Winkler draws on the application of the conceptual framework adjacent to 
security sector reform in context of strategic shifts in the Euro-Atlantic region. Building 
on the experiences of joint military- and development-related programs funded by the 
                                                 
34 See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status, and 
Challenges, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives. (Washington, D.C. Washington, April 1999), p. 2. A thorough analysis to 
competition among suppliers in important high-technology markets, including software development, 
communications, aeronautics, and defense is proposed by Tracy R. Lewis and Huseyin Yildirim, 
“Managing Dynamic Competition,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4. (Sep., 2002), 779-97. 
35 Theodor Winkler, Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector 
and International Order, Occasional Paper no. 1, Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Armed 
Forces (October 2002), 10-1. 
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United States and Germany, but also on the positive results supported by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom, Winkler asserts that “linking security 
sector reform and development cooperation into a joint strategic approach,” may prove a 
very resourceful experience.36  
As we can see, all the above objectives of defense reform are intended to reduce 
costs and improve the performance of the defense apparatus, primarily through adopting 
a managerial-like approach to defense management. Although at a different scale, given 
the starting point and the scope of defense reform in Romania, these will be the indicators 
used by the further assessment of the progress registered by the national political and 
military authorities while implementing defense reform. 
In the new political, social, economic and administrative context, re-establishing 
the authority of the state apparatus raised serious concerns for the Western community, 
especially when it came to security and defense organizations, perceived as instruments 
of power by the former dictators.  
Caught in the midst of historical transformations to ensure the transition to 
democracy, good governance and sustainable development, the Romanian military 
organization was facing dramatic changes. These changes regarded the roles and missions 
the armed forces were called to perform in the new, democratic regime. The relationship 
between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the society at large, with political leaders 
and population in particular, as well as the institutional capacity to respond to the new 
challenges were also among the key objectives at stake for the defense reform.  
Defense reform was part and parcel of the complex challenges facing the 
transitional democracies of CEE, including Romania. Such challenges included the 
overall restructuring of public administration, the legislative framework to shape the new 
roles and missions of the state institutions. Thus, downsizing and restructuring of the 
military organization, the professionalization of the armed forces, or the implementation 
of basic democratic principles such as civilian control over the armed forces, 
transparency and accountability were only a few of the objectives of the overarching 
priorities of the transition process. 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 39. 
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That is because “In general, defense reform is intended to bring about changes in 
the military establishment, to achieve greater oversight and control, greater effectiveness 
and/or greater efficiencies in spending,” as pointed out by Bruneau and Trinkunas in the 
introductory chapter of a forthcoming book.37 
2. Defining the Elements of CMR and Identifying Indicators for 
Analysis 
The success of defense reform in the field of democratic civil-military relations – 
but also regarding the overall changes that are envisioned in the field of security and 
defense, one could argue – can be easily understood as a dependent variable that can be 
challenged by each of the elements of civil-military relations trinity, as proposed by 
Bruneau and Trinkunas.38 This brings us to another inter-connected theme regarding the 
shift in thinking imposed by the recent approach to good governance and new 
institutionalism by the end of the 1990s, where the attention moved from military 
spending to decision-making processes involved in the ‘guns and butter’ dilemma, as 
argued by Jeanne Giraldo in a recent book dedicated to contemporary approaches to civil-
military relations.39 
The difficulty in distinguishing among measures to improve civilian democratic 
control over the armed forces, or to reach certain levels of efficiency and effectiveness in 
a military bureaucracy is, by definition, an ambitious task and a debatable issue, 
irrespective of the democratic history of a given country.  
When it comes to the young democracies of CEE, where the legacies of 
communist regimes challenged the fundamental nature of state institutions and their 
legitimacy, the task of analyzing successes and failures registered by security and defense 
reform is even more complicated. This is because isolating the specific evidence of the 
objectives, resources, and strategies embraced to reach the priorities involved in this 
                                                 
37 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas. “Global Trends and their impact on Civil-Military 
Relations,” draft chapter of unpublished book (2007). Material provided by the author. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Jeanne Giraldo, “Chapter 7 - Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective 
Governance”, In: Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. (Eds.) T. 
Bruneau and S. Tollefson. 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006). 
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equation may prove to be a difficult endeavor, if applied to defense reform and civil-
military relations, as the experience of young democracies of CEE demonstrates. 
However, beyond its complexity, such an approach is a must, when analyzing the 
progress of defense reform, and the issues of civilian democratic control, efficiency and 
effectiveness, as it helps us better understand the historical developments seen in the field 
of defense reform, given the specific circumstances and priorities, as well as to draw 
some lessons learned from this painful process.  
If the theme of “civilian democratic control over the armed forces,” seen through 
the lenses of classical approaches proposed by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz is 
not a novelty among scholars, the same can not be said about the notions of “security and 
defense efficiency” and “military effectiveness,” the other two pillars of the trinity 
guiding the research.  
a. Civilian Democratic Control over the Armed Forces 
Establishing democratic institutions to enforce civilian democratic control 
over the armed forces is nevertheless the first and clearly most “privileged”40 dimension 
of the civil-military relations trinity to be analyzed, especially when it comes to the 
defense reform of the transition democracies of CEE in the aftermath of the Cold War.    
But a clear distinction between “democratic” and “civilian” control over 
the armed forces does not exist. Furthermore, subjective control over the military may 
have its benefits in certain phases of establishment and consolidation of the new 
democracies in Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s, as Barany 
observes when comparing the parliamentary versus presidential regimes embraced by the 





                                                 
40 T. Bruneau and H. Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-
Military Relations,” Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 5 (December 2006), 778. 
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are characteristics that indicate rather subjective civilian control over the military, which 
signify the “maximization of civilian influence and then reduction of the officers’ sphere 
of autonomous decision-making.”41 
As argued by Richard H. Kohn, “the paradox of Huntington's formulation 
is that the greater a military's autonomy, the less control civilians actually exercise; while 
‘objective’ civilian control might minimize military involvement in politics, it also 
decreases civilian control over military affairs.”42 
On the other hand, for many scholars civilian control is often seen as a 
prerequisite feature of a stable, liberal democracy, and our argument would build on this 
approach. Paraphrasing Huntington's writings in The Soldier and the State, Kohn 
summarizes the civilian control ideal as “the proper subordination of a competent, 
professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority.”43 
Another attempt to differentiate between the “democratic” and “civil” 
control belongs to Larry Watts, an author that brings us closer to Romania’s specificity, 
the case study for further focus in the thesis. Watts refers to the democratic control seen 
as “that control exercised by elected representatives of the people principally, but not 
only, through the legislature.”44 Thus, as the author concludes, democratic control should 
be the orienting benchmark of civil-military reform, as inclusiveness and transparency are 
among its determining elements. 
According to Kohn, there are two challenges that civilian control presents 
nowadays, depending on the level of maturity of the democracy. First, as the author has 
put it, for mature democracies, “the test is whether civilians can exercise supremacy in 
                                                 
41 Zoltan Barany, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience”, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Oct., 1997), 29.  
42 Richard H. Kohn is a professor of history and chairman of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and 
Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as well as Executive Secretary of the Triangle 
Institute for Security Studies. See R. Kohn, An essay on Civilian Control of the Military, 1997, electronic 
resource, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html, (accessed March 2, 2006). 
43 R. Kohn, An essay on Civilian Control of the Military, 1997. 
44 Larry Watts, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. 
Democratic Control”. Journal of Political & Military Sociology 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002): 61-63. 
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military policy and decision-making.”45 Second, the challenges facing the newly-
emerging democracies are much more profound, as they relate to establishing civilian 
control while preventing political involvements at the level of the military, or even more, 
to prevent possible military overthrow. 
Michael Desch argues that the level of civilian control is determined by 
“whether or not civilians prevail in disagreements with the military.”46 Especially this 
definition opens room to address the issue close to our view on the problem, namely the 
competence and experience of civilian leaders, or the kind of control mechanisms 
civilians are likely to adopt. 
Taking the above into account, a few ingredients to enable civilian control 
relate to democratic governance and rule of law, civil liberty, a stable method for 
peaceful succession in power, workable practices for electing officials, accountability to 
public institutions, effective countervailing power and a military tradition committed to 
neutrality.47 If the last requirements are not necessarily strengths of CEE countries, the 
first should make the difference.  
Building on the characteristics of what he coined “objective civilian 
control,” Huntington underlines, in an article of 1995, the complex challenges in which 
civil-military relations developed at the beginning of the 1990s in former authoritarian 
regimes in different regions of the world, including the CEE and Latin American 
countries. After taking into account major shifts facing the newly emerged democracies 
in terms of political, economic, and social changes, the author explains why civil-military 
relations are “a dramatic exception to the lackluster performance of democracies in so 
many other areas.” The conclusion he draws in this respect is that the overall assessment 
of the state of civil-military relations is a positive one, in comparison with how the 
emerging democracies have dealt with other problems, as follows: “The new democracies 
                                                 
45 R. Kohn, Ibid.. 
46 Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 5. 
47 Edwin Micewski, NS3025 – Introduction to Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, CA, Naval 
Postgraduate School, NSA Department, Course notes, (Winter 2006). See also Richard Kohn (1997), 145-
46. 
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have been more successful in dealing with CMR than in most of other major challenges 
they face. Sustaining that success now depends on their ability to make progress in 
dealing with the ills that lie outside their militaries and within their societies at large.”48 
However, the establishment of a constitutional framework to allow the 
formation of the defense commissions to oversee military expenditures or major 
procurement programs is not an end in itself, neither is it the only indicator of democratic 
civilian control over defense and security issues.  
The so-called “civilianization” of the defense department also has its own 
advantages in terms of defense efficiency, as we shall see. This is because, “Unless a 
sufficient cadre of well-prepared experts is available to advise political leaders on 
military questions, civilian control will remain little more than a charade,”49 as pointed 
out by Bruneau and Tollefson in the concluding chapter of their book of 2006. 
In their recent study dedicated to intelligence reforms, democracy and 
effectiveness, Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau argue that the three relevant questions 
to be answered regarding the civil-military relations in a democratic regime (which are 
also consistent with the present analysis) are as follows: “1) Do electorally and 
constitutionally accountable civilian officials control the military? 2) Do they handle it in 
such a way that it can be effective at achieving its roles and missions from war fighting 
and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or emergency-response work? 3) Is all this being 
accomplished with maximum efficiency?”50 Under these circumstances, the levels of 




                                                 
48 Samuel Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” Journal of Democracy, Baltimore, Vol. 
6, Issue 4 (Oct. 1995), 9-17. 
49 Bruneau and Tollefson (Eds.) Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military 
Relations. 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 265. 
50 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, “Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness”. 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 3, National Endowment for Democracy and the John Hopkins 
University Press (July 2006), 31. 
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account the objectives of defense reform at different stages, the constitutional and 
legislative changes to put them into place, or the structural arrangements and policies to 
enforce them.51  
But some of the impediments to intelligence reform, as proposed by the 
two authors, are equally valid in the case of defense reform. Thus, significant overlaps 
may be noticed in the case of politicians’ limited knowledge on security and defense 
matters, as a key reason for their lack of enthusiasm and superficiality in controlling and 
ensuring civilian oversight over defense spending, but also to the relative “freedom from 
budgetary, legal, and other restrictions” that the security and defense enjoyed during 
communism, a privilege they naturally want to preserve.52  
If applied to the Romanian Ministry of Defense, the above can be 
translated into the higher degree of secrecy existing during the early stages of defense 
reform regarding the concrete manning, allocation of financial resources, or even the real 
pay scale of active militaries. This was because of the lack of information (a database to 
aggregate all the data was absent) rather than the defense officials’ efforts to conceal this 
information. However, there are still many questions that are unanswered, with regards to 
some controversial acquisition contracts or the attributes and outcomes of military 
intelligence, the latter being somehow reasonable in certain limits.  
Furthermore, the imperatives proposed by Boraz and Bruneau to advance 
democratic control over the intelligence community, its transparency and its 
effectiveness, are also transferable to the defense reform, as they consist of issues such 
as: raising public interest and pressure, increasing civilian awareness and competence, 
                                                 
51 These criteria and inquiries build on the criteria established by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 
1994, then promoted through the means of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), that was set up 
in 1997.  Among the founding principles of the EAPC there are the following “expanding contacts between 
NATO and Partners and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation”. (See “Chapter 2 – 
New Institutions,” NATO Handbook, Ed. 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020202.htm, 
accessed March 7, 2007). 
52 S. Boraz and T. Bruneau, “Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness”. Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 3, National Endowment for Democracy and the John Hopkins University Press 
(July 2006),  32-4.  
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institutionalizing periodical assessments on how the roles and missions are accomplished, 
fostering trust and credibility, or professionalization.53 
In an attempt to conceptualize civil-military relations in the contemporary 
world, a book recently published by Hans Born et al. argues that the issue is concerned in 
a broad sense with the social relations between the military and society, while in a narrow 
sense regards the political relations between civilian governments and the military, 
viewed through the lens of basic principles as follows: openness, transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy and pluralism. Accordingly, democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces is about good governance, defined by the authors as “effective, honest, 
equitable, inclusive, transparent and accountable and consistent with the rule of law.”54 
That is because, as the analysis demonstrates, the essence of defense 
reform had to address both political and military measures of success, and both 
quantitative and qualitative progress. As Simon and Binnendijk have put it in their 
assessment of 1997:  
In addition to active participation in PfP, new members would have to 
ensure that adequate resources are available to assume the added and 
considerable financial obligations of joining, and to develop necessary 
interoperability-to include: (1) defense management reforms in areas such 
as transparent defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, 
appropriate legislation, and parliamentary and public accountability; and 
(2) minimal standards in collective defense planning to pave the way for 
more detailed operational planning with the Alliance.55 
All the above introduce the necessity of addressing the conceptual 
framework for understanding the other two elements of civil-military relations, namely 
defense efficiency and military effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 35-7. 
54 Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhlmann. Civil-Military Relations in 
Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5-6. 
55 Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk: “Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July 
1997 Summit,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Number 101 (Feb. 1997), 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF101/forum101.html (accessed December 12, 2006). 
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b. Defense Efficiency 
Focusing on military effectiveness and defense efficiency might prove one 
of the most ambitious tasks of an approach to democratic civil-military relations and the 
developments in the implementation of defense initiatives. That is because distinguishing 
between the terms of ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness,’ as proposed by the classics in the 
theory of management is not an easy task in itself. Furthermore, when it comes to their 
applicability to defense and security, the characteristics attached are even more blurred. 
The issue presents its challenges even for long-established democracies, 
that have the experience of public scrutiny over military budgeting and defense spending, 
and where the fundamental democratic principles (such as the rule of law, accountability, 
transparency and efficiency)56 have ceased to be simple theoretical desires addressing the 
governmental agencies empowered with legitimate means to provide security and defense 
to citizens.  The question of measuring efficiency and effectiveness to see how successful 
the defense and security reforms are in the new democracies of Latin America or Central 
and South-Eastern Europe or to improve them is nevertheless an extremely difficult task. 
However, such an approach would be worth the effort, as it provides us with the 
comprehensive understanding of the defense reform strategies and the value-added by the 
institutional changes that many of the transitional democracies of CEE embarked upon 
sixteen years ago. 
According to scholarly dictionaries, the concept of ‘efficiency’ is 
associated with “the effective operation as measured by a comparison of production with 
cost (time, money, human resources),” while ‘efficient’ suggests “an acting or a potential 
for action or use in such a way as to avoid loss or waste.”57  
Going further, the approaches to the terms proposed by the classics of 
management theory distinguish between “effectiveness” and “efficiency” as follows:  
                                                 
56 Larry Watts adds ‘inclusiveness’ to these basic principles of good governance. (See L. Watts, 
“Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control.” 
Journal of Political & Military Sociology 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002), 63. 
57 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th Ed, Encyclopedia Britannica, (Merriam-Webster: 
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Using the definitions proposed by Peter Drucker, according to whom 
“Efficiency is concerned with doing things right. Effectiveness is doing the right 
things,”58 one can assert that a major element distinguishing the two is that 
‘effectiveness’ means “capability of producing an effect,” and paying attention 
exclusively to setting objectives, while efficiency brings about the costs involved to 
achieving those goals. Mutatis mutandis, achieving the military effectiveness may be 
interpreted as and depends on the established Objective Force, the forces deployed in 
theatre, or the professionalization of the armed forces, while on the other hand, defense 
efficiency is achieved by using fewer resources – e.g. people, money, equipment – to 
generate a given output. 
For the reader of the federal page of The Washington Post, Bradley 
Graham is a well-known name, as the journalist published a series of important articles 
regarding how the defense business is managed by defense and security institutions and 
officials in the United States. For instance, in 1997, the journalist discussed the initiative 
of then Defense Secretary William S. Cohen to establish an independent panel (Task 
Force for Defense Reform), in an attempt to reduce overhead and streamline business 
practices. Buying more off-the-shelf technology and computerizing operations is only 
one of the examples of the successful initiatives already used by the Pentagon to improve 
efficiency. Borrowing from the objectives of the panel, there are three ways that are 
envisioned to improve efficiency and wring savings from defense agencies, as follows: 
“reducing the staff, eliminating duplications, and saving more money in a host of 
agencies and departmental field activities.”59 
As underlined by Paul Kaminski, former Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology), it is a truism that competition brings incentives for 
organizations to improve quality and reduce costs. Thus, it appears that “competition 
increases efficiency” and that it is the competition itself, and not the outsourcing – as 
                                                 
58 Peter Drucker. People and Performance: The Best of Peter Drucker on Management (New York: 
Harper's College Press, 1977), 33. 
59 Bradley Graham, “Defense Efficiency,” The Washington Post, Washington D.C., May 15, (1997),  
A.21.  
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commonly believed – that “drives the best value.”60 To clarify the issue, the author goes 
further and stresses out the key conditions to be fulfilled if activities are to be outsourced, 
as follows: a) if in-house performance of that activity is not required to meet mission 
requirements; b) if a competitive commercial market exists for that activity; and c) if 
outsourcing the activity results in the best value for the government.61 In his view, the 
rationales of outsourcing go beyond the attainment of objectives related to cost savings, 
but also to the more profound transformation of the defense bureaucracy and performance 
improvement:  
If done correctly, outsourcing will not only save us money, it will help us 
build the kind of organization we want DoD to be: an organization that 
thrives on competition, innovation, responsiveness to changing needs, 
efficiency and reliability.62 
Another important reference regards the results-oriented management. 
Building on Newcomer’s definitions of results-oriented or performance-based 
management,63 in an article published in 2005, Sharon Caudle argues that “Results 
management relies in large part on defining the mission, key actors who must deliver it, 
and principles guiding choices about results that should be achieved.” 64 The author 
critically analyses several approaches for homeland security results management, among 
which risk management, balanced scorecard, and capabilities-based planning and 
assessment. She underlines that each of these approaches can “(a) define the goal of the 
homeland security mission, (b) establish the level of results to be achieved, (c) identify 
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61 Ibid., 4. 
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63 K. Newcomer, E.T. Jennings, C. Broom, and A. Lomax (Eds.), Meeting the challenges of 
performance-oriented government (Washington, DC: American Society for Public  Administration/Center 
for Accountability and Performance. 2002), 14. 
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investments necessary to achieve the planned results, and (d) provide a way to measure 
progress,” and concludes that future research is needed in order to select the best of these 
approaches.65 
In order to identify concrete indicators of progress with defense efficiency, 
most authors measure it by addressing decisions in defense procurement, contracting out, 
managing defense industry, or the question of the professionalization of the armed forces, 
including the “civilianization, as all the above refer to the cost element and how resources 
are spent to accomplish objectives, and implement defense policies. Understandably, the 
Western democracies, and especially the United States, where founders of the science of 
management were born, dedicated their academic work to finding ways to improve 
defense efficiency and effectiveness since the 1960s.66 
In an article published in Law and Contemporary Problems in 1964, 
Frederick Moore raised important questions regarding efficiency in procurement, given 
the fact that “Procurement and contracting by the Department of Defense with U.S. 
industry amounts to almost half of the total defense budget.”67 As the author put it, “since 
the price-cost comparison is inconclusive, the criteria for efficiency in defense 
procurement must rest on the degree of progressiveness and innovation and on the level 
of profits; yet even these criteria are obscured by the government’s role in the internal 
management of the programs.”68 As underlined in the concluding section of the article, 
no one would quarrel that competitive bidding results in favorable cost-price 
relationships, although this procedure has limited applicability in the procurement of 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 373. 
66 See, for instance Frederick C. Mosher, “Old Concepts and New Problems,” Public Administration 
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major weapons systems.69 More recent sources dedicated to the issue of efficiency in 
defense procurement after the Cold War focus on the issue of contracting.70  
But increasing defense efficiency is also accomplished through adequate 
policies and practices regarding human resources management, as a consistent part of the 
scholarly literature demonstrate. Part and parcel of the above is the debate on the 
advantages of the “civilianization” of the defense department, one of the issues that will 
be analyzed in section four of the thesis, when reviewing the Romanian case and some of 
the initiatives that are undertaken by the Romanian MoD to increase efficiency. 
An important contribution to the issue was brought by the study of 1978 
by Binkin, Kanter and Clark, whose attempt to evaluate efficiency relies on comparing 
the costs of military and civilian manpower.71 Based on the assumption that “[personnel] 
ceilings encourage efficiency,” the authors assert that ceilings also serve two other 
purposes as well, both of them visible aspects of CMR at all times: a) ceilings brake 
bureaucratic growth; and 2) ceilings can serve as a political instrument.72 In chapter five 
of the study (“The Military-Civilian Mix”) the issue of cost and effectiveness shows 
important evidence regarding comparing the costs of military and civilian manpower.  As 
the authors summarize,  
In recent years, since the compatibility pay rule has been extended to 
military personnel, and particularly to the advent of the all-volunteer force, 
some analysts have come to believe that it is less costly to fill a job with a 
federal civilian than with a uniformed employee.73  
Indeed, the DoD shares this view:  
                                                 
69 Ibid., 15 
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…civilians are generally less costly than military manpower. This results 
primarily from the fact that military personnel generate more secondary 
support requirements than civilians… Further, additional backup (or 
pipeline) positions are included in military strength as trainees, transients, 
patients, and prisoners.74 
In an attempt to check the validity of such assumption, the authors review 
the costs involved by employing military and civilian personnel, taking into account three 
categories of costs: a) compensations - which include an array of benefits, some of which 
are in kind, some deferred, and others conditional; b) pipeline costs – in addition to the 
employees on the job, the military services also maintain a pool of people to offset those 
absent from their jobs while undergoing training, traveling between assignments, and the 
like;  and c) indirect support costs.75  
One of the conclusions of the authors of the study is that “in a great 
majority of cases, conversions from military to white-collar civilian personnel would 
result in long-term budgetary savings, whose precise magnitude would depend on the 
nature of the billets being converted. By similar logic, the analysis suggests that the 
substitution of military personnel for blue-collar civilians, at current pay rates, might also 
lower costs.”76  
In the authors’ opinion, to obtain the best balance between military 
personnel, civilians and contractors, the following steps should be taken:  
a) a clear distinction must be drawn between jobs that, for reasons of 
national security, should be filled by military employees and those that can 
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performed by government employees must be defined; and c) all other 
positions should be filled by whichever type of manpower is most 
effective in relation to its costs.77 
The issue is further considered by a study performed in 1998 by scholars 
of the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which is published by RAND.78 The 
study focuses on “civilianization” and “outsourcing” as decisive options for reducing 
operating costs in defense.  
According to Susan Gates and Albert Robbert, “civilianization” is defined 
as “the transfer of functions performed by military personnel to civil service 
personnel,”79 while “outsourcing” involves the “transfer of functions performed by either 
military or civil service personnel to the private sector.”80  
“Civilianization” is widely believed to reduce costs, because “civil service 
workers are assumed to be less expensive than their military counterparts,” as argued by 
the authors of the research. Furthermore, the study encourages the DoD to use the 
minimum number of personnel to meet national security objectives and to use civil 
service personnel whenever possible. Among the difficulties acknowledged by the 
authors, is that to establish elements of costs other than pay (e.g. health care costs for 
military personnel), or the lack of data, which can bring about biased cost estimates. 81 
As the report of 1998 recalls, by reviewing some of the rationales used by 
the DoD Directive 1100.4, issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1954, when 
deciding if a position in the organizational chart of the DoD should be labeled as a 
‘military’ job, the following conditions should be accomplished: a) that position is an 
essential element of combat readiness; b) that position is needed to ensure rotational 
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opportunities for personnel stationed overseas; or c) the law requires that such a position 
to be staffed by military personnel.82 The analysis confirms that “civilianization can 
produce cost savings under many, but not all, circumstances.”83  
Another issue of recent interest is that regarding the flexibility that should 
be allowed to military units in planning and employing the staff they need, as at that level 
the requirements of personnel are best known. In this respect, a study published by the 
RAND Corporation in 2006 suggests that: “In most cases, workforce planning should be 
left to local installations or other organizational units, such as commands, agencies, or 
functional sponsors, which may be more attuned to their specific personnel requirements 
than Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).”84 In the authors’ view, the only role that 
the OSD can play is a supportive one, consisting of coordinating efforts across 
installations and occupations within the Department of Defense. 
However, if analyzed in connection with the principle of civilian 
democratic control, the idea of ‘civilianizing’ the defense institution captures current 
discourse and practices, especially for countries still searching for the most appropriate 
ways to enforce civilian control over the armed forces and the issues of efficiency. It is 
worth mentioning, in this respect the activity organized by the George C. Marshall 
European Center for Security Studies organized in Yerevan, Armenia, on February 5-7, 
2007. The topic of the conference was “Armenian Defense Reforms: Seminar on the 
Civilianization of the Ministry of Defense and Amending the Law on Defense,” and 
among the aspects discussed were the following: How has the process of civilianization 
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in newly-created civilian posts of former military personnel (who benefit from early 
retirement packages): how was the issue addressed, especially in the new members of the 
North-Atlantic Alliance?85  
As the section dedicated to the human resource management policies 
within the Romanian Ministry of Defense will demonstrate, these bring about one of the 
most controversial, though most clear-cut principles pursued by the defense bureaucracy 
to increase efficiency.  
c. Military Effectiveness 
A recent and inspiring approach to ‘military effectiveness’ belongs to 
Ferenc Molnar, according to whom, “The measure of [military] effectiveness is most 
likely a properly financed, socially accepted and capable military, which requires 
balanced civil-military relations in a consolidated democracy.”86 
Scholars like Suzanne Nielsen argue that there is a significant difference 
in approach between Huntington and Janowitz as regards the causal relationship between 
civil-military relations and military effectiveness. Thereby, while Huntington discusses 
“military effectiveness as a product of civil-military relations,” Janowitz “does not 
entirely separate professionalism and effectiveness,” which bring about three major 
challenges (such as “defining and operationalizing military effectiveness,” “defining 
civil-military relations,” and decoding the “effectiveness – or rather efficiency, one could 
say – of a military organization”), as Nielsen argues.87 
In 1999, two years after his article on the Pentagon’s initiatives to improve 
efficiency was published, Bradley Graham revisited the issue of civil-military relations, 
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this time with a focus on military effectiveness. Following the findings of a study run by 
the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, a research group in Durham, North Carolina,88 
Graham observes that “elite military officers have largely abandoned political neutrality.” 
In the journalist’s opinion, this brought about distrust in civil-military relations: “During 
the 1990s, the principle of civilian control has been subjected to more ongoing strain than 
at any time in American History.” As mentioned in the study, “Our research identified 
numerous schisms and trends that have undermined civil-military cooperation and, in 
certain circumstances, could degrade military effectiveness.” Related to that, a distinct 
correlation between the number of veterans in politics and the use of force in American 
power politics has been observed since 1816: “The more veterans in the national political 
elite, the less likely the United States was to initiate the use of force.”89 Examples of 
current politicians who were former prominent members of the military corps of 
professionals abound in Romanian politics. 
In a conference paper presented for a workshop organized in 2002 by the 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), François Godet, a 
legal adviser of DCAF proposed a comprehensive list of normative elements of civil-
military relations  that could be laid down in the Constitution, or in secondary legislation 
(laws, presidential decrees, governmental decisions etc.). Covering all the dimensions of 
the trinity, some of the elements that fall into the first category – civilian control – are as 
follows: a) mission of the armed forces, b) principle of subordination of the armed forces 
to the civil authority, c) political neutrality of the armed forces, d) competency for 
deploying the armed forces in the defense of national territory or within the framework of 
an alliance, e) competency for declaring war, and f) principle of conscripting armed 
forces.90 According to the author, among the more detailed legal provisions that could be 
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laid down in laws and governmental decisions, the following are included: a) prohibition 
of partisan activities in military barracks, b) designation of high-ranking generals, c) 
professional status of military personnel, d) assistance to professional conversion after 
completion of assignment, etc.91  
Taking into account all the above, there are authors who consider that 
‘democratic civil-military relations’ is synonymous with “effective democratic 
management of the security sector and of the related government agencies and hence 
effective participation in NATO.”92 
As the following chapters demonstrate, throughout generations of defense 
reform, Romania made consistent progress in establishing such a legal framework, to 
enforce healthy civil-military relations and implement the principles of democratic 
oversight, transparency and accountability which are usually associated with such a 
normative framework.  
B. CONCLUSION 
As the section demonstrates, identifying appropriate indicators for healthy civil-
military relations is not an easy task. There are two sets of rationales that can explain this 
difficulty. First, there are some indicators which are rather qualitative in nature, which 
makes their measurement rather complicated. This applies especially in the case of 
civilian democratic control, where the existence of constitutional and legal arrangements 
or the creation of institutional frameworks does not necessarily guarantee the appropriate 
implementation of the existing legislation and the actual exercise of civilian control, 
through the means available to democratic societies: the elected representatives, 
parliamentary defense commissions, media and citizens. Second, even if the elements of 
civil-military relations that are addressed are quantifiable in nature, which is the case of 
defense efficiency and military effectiveness, the opinions regarding “what should 
constitute adequate measurements” vary substantially. Furthermore, most of the 
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assumptions made on efficiency in procurement, civilianization of the defense ministries, 
contracting out and privatization could be biased, as there are always hidden costs which 
make cost-related comparisons almost impossible. However, to summarize the above, in 
searching for indicators of healthy civil-military relations, one could build on a net 
assessment framework that takes account of progress with defense reform on the 
following coordinates.  
First, in terms of civilian control over the armed forces, the aspects that should be 
analyzed are as follows: a) constitutional and legal framework (its existence and 
enforcement), b) institutional arrangements and roles and missions of the parties involved 
in all stages of defense management, c) the information flow and communication among 
institutions, and d) the balanced mix of military personnel and civilian appointees in key 
decision-making positions regarding the defense. 
Second, some of the indicators to be considered when analyzing defense 
efficiency are those that indicate the best value of public money and cost savings: a) the 
planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS), b) organizational restructuring 
and the “civilianization” of defense institution, c) defense contracting and procurement, 
and d) performance management. How these developed throughout the defense reform 
process upon which the Romanian armed forces embarked since the December 1989 
Revolution will be analyzed in the fourth chapter. 
Third, among the indicators of military effectiveness, the third element of civil-
military relations, the following appear to be of utmost importance: a) the 
professionalization of the armed forces, b) the transformation strategy that is designed 
and put in place by the defense institutions, c) innovation, and d) force projection. 
To conclude, both defense reform, and the elements of the civil-military relations 
trinity recommend a systematic approach to the context in which defense reform occurs, 
the objectives and effective allocation of resources (that can be further detailed as human 
capital, Objective Force, structures, money, and equipment), as well as to the policies and 
strategies employed to reach desired defense reform outcomes. As noted by many 
authors, if the analysis of civilian control enjoys a great attention from academics, being 
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primarily descriptive and presupposing qualitative interpretations, deciphering successes 
and failures regarding military effectiveness and defense efficiency is not an easy task. It 
involves complex analyses of the defense bureaucracy, involving both qualitative and 
quantitative judgments, which can constitute reasons for which such an approach was not 
a common one among scholars.93 
Given the above, the assessment template proposed for analyzing Romania’s 
progress with defense reform, with a focus on civilian democratic control, military 
effectiveness and defense efficiency will focus on a small number of levels of analysis, 
such as objectives and policies, key structures and their functioning, constitutional and 
legal framework, and the specific challenges encountered when implementing defense 
reform. The analysis will bring about concrete progress and failures of the Romanian 
military organization in accommodating the new roles and missions assigned to the 
armed forces in a democracy, the painful measures attached to the MoD reorganization 
and restructuring, and defense planning and budgetary control. Even more ambitious 
objectives, such as those regarding the full professionalization of the armed forces, or the 
challenges facing civilian and military authorities when dealing with defense 
procurement issues, privatization of military industry and contracting out may also be 
addressed. 
But what were the specific circumstances in which defense reform occurred in 
CEE countries and in Romania specifically? What was the state of social, political, 
judicial and military affairs inherited after decades of communism? In order to better 
understand the progress registered throughout the last sixteen years of defense reform and 
the challenges regarding CMR in the CEE countries, with particular emphasis to 
Romania, a brief return to the legacies of communism appears to be relevant.  
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III. THE LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE; ROMANIA’S BEQUEST 
A. CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE; ROMANIA’S SPECIFICITY 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) found themselves caught in the midst of social, political, and economic turmoil. 
Re-building the state’s authority, re-installing the rule of law, and re-capacitating 
institutions to perform their functions in the new, democratic and market-type 
environment were only a few of the issues on the agenda of the new democratic regime. 
These were essential in the transition towards the institutional internalization of basic 
democratic principles such as good governance, and sustainable development. Reiterating 
a paradigm proposed a few years earlier by Elster,94 Hermann Hesse uses the metaphor of 
“rebuilding the boat in the open sea,”95 to synthesize the common interests regarding 
NATO and European Union (EU) membership and universal difficulties to overcome 
them by the majority of Visegrad96 and SIGMA97 countries during the early 1990s.  
The military organization and the armed forces of young democracies of CEE, 
including Romania, were in the midst of all these challenges. Furthermore, one can easily 
say that the progress seen regarding the implementation of defense reform and improving 
civil-military relations were probably the most remarkable shifts, despite the numerous 
competing priorities, and scarce resources available to implement the radical ideological, 
political and military changes suggested by the Western actors. 
Building on the legacies of former communist regimes in CEE is yet one of the 
preferred themes of almost every scholar who attempts to address the always 
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controversial issue of democratic civil-military relations. Unfortunately, the majority of 
the material written on the topic is rather descriptive than explanatory. Even fewer 
scholars attempt to provide appropriate recommendations on how to improve the various 
aspects involved by the CMR.  
Nevertheless, there are not many studies to capture the changes that occurred in 
institutional capacity, the dramatic shifts seen at the level of military doctrine and the 
roles and missions of the armed forces, and re-structuring the armed forces to respond to 
the new risks and threats, although all of the above were part and parcel of the broader 
social and economic reforms. Although they were at a different stage of complexity, if 
compared with the magnitude of the defense reform initiatives that where implemented in 
the modern armies throughout the 1980s,98 the standards for defense reform in CEE 
during the early 1990s were almost indiscriminately established by Western democracies.  
But a few questions should be addressed in this respect: Were these reform 
initiatives, and the external pressures to pursue them adequately tailored, in order to 
answer the specific needs of the young democracies that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Cold War era? Were the objectives of defense reform and the strategies to reach them 
truly appropriate to the situation that existed and the ambitious targets of the former 
Warsaw Pact member states, with their supra-dimensional armies and the scarce 
resources to be allocated to defense in the new geo-strategic arrangements of the early 
1990s?  
The influx of ideas and practices regarding democratization of society, good 
governance, and sustainable development found a fertile terrain in the countries of CEE, 
as they embarked on radical transformations regarding the management of state affairs, 
including defense. In this respect, as noted by many authors, one of the frequent mistakes 
that CEE countries make when it comes to reforming the defense sector and progress 
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with civil-military relations relates to the temptation to embrace ready-made Western 
solutions. Naturally, the lack of ownership of such reforms proved to be 
counterproductive, while the static approach to the phenomena limited the analysis to a 
limited number of static indicators, as some scholars mention.99  
As argued by Joo, one of the important contributors to the assessment of defense 
reform in the countries of CEE, the majority of analyses conducted by American and 
NATO teams of experts advising on military reform would focus on formal, static 
indicators, rather than on effectiveness and performance. Thus, among the indicators that 
the author believes were considered important by external agents and which are also 
accountable for civilian control, the following are listed: the number of civilians 
appointed within the various defense and security agencies, the timing of these 
appointments, the stability of their tenure, and their impact on the civil-military 
relationship.100 To accurately evaluate Romania’s progress with defense reform, it is 
necessary to start with a brief incursion into the past.  
B. REVISITING RELEVANT THEORIES ON CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
1. Huntington’s Theory: The Transition from Subjective to Objective 
Civilian Control 
The aim of this section is to describe the main differences between the state of 
civil-military relations as encountered by Romania during communism, with special 
attention to the last years, and the period since the historical changes of 1989. 
Making use of Huntington’s typology of civilian control, it will be asserted that 
the constitutional form of subjective civilian control characterized Romanian civil-
military relations during the communist regime. After the 1989 Revolution, a transition 
from subjective civilian control to objective civilian control occurred. This was possible 
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mainly due to major legislative changes that occurred in the defense and security milieu. 
Therefore, the second part focuses on the effects of the internal and external security 
environment on the civil-military relations making use of Desch’s structural theory.  
When writing on the topic of the relative power distribution between civilian 
groups and the military, Samuel Huntington emphasizes the dichotomy that exists 
between the subjective and the objective control of the military.101 As the author argues, 
civilian supremacy can be obtained if the military power is reduced in comparison with 
civilian power. Following this logic, if civilian power is maximized, then subjective 
control arises. On the other hand, if the military is separated from the political sphere by 
making it professional, then objective control is attainable. 
The subjective control, in addition to the maximization of civilian influence, 
infers the possibility of reducing the professionalism of armed forces. In Huntington’s 
words, “the simplest way of minimizing military power would appear to be the 
maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military.” Nonetheless, a 
muscular civilian authority controlling the armed forces and a professional officer corps 
could coexist.102 
As Huntington points out, ‘subjective control’ may be achieved in three ways: by 
governmental institutions, social class, or constitutional form. Civilian control by 
governmental institution implies that one of the state powers (executive, judicial, 
legislative) attempts to maximize its control over the armed forces. Accordingly, the 
checks and balances between different state institutions affect the military.  
Considering the Romanian case during the communist regime one could argue 
that a presidential control was in place. However, because the president controlled the 
legislative body and the judicial branch as well, there was no struggle of one state 
institution to increase its power vis-à-vis others. Consequently, the control of the military 
through governmental institutions, as defined by Huntington, could not have been 
obtained. 
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Subjective control through social [inter]class struggle requires at least two 
powerful social classes. Such control could not characterize totalitarian regimes, since 
both, from a theoretical and practical perspective there is only one social class. In 
communist Romania, however, there was not even one single political class with 
(relative) political power, namely the proletariat – as Marx argues – but only Ceausescu’s 
clique, mainly consisting of his family, who ruled the country. 
If subjective control of the military had existed in Romania before 1989 – the year 
of the revolution – then the constitutional form would be the case. Even though this type 
of subjective civilian control is not particular to totalitarian regimes, it represented a 
characteristic of communist countries. Huntington asserts that this type of control 
requires the politicization of the military. The politicization is possible by using political 
commissars in the military or other party militarized units as means of ‘control of 
violence,’ i.e., security forces directly subordinated to ministries other than defense. 
Specifically, in totalitarian regimes, the state would use “terror, conspiracy, surveillance 
and force,”103 to control their armed forces. 
All the militaries of communist states were affected to varying degrees by the 
politicization process, and Romania was no exception. An independent chain of 
command assured by ‘political commissars’ existed. Those officers were prepared and 
appointed by the Communist Party and in many cases they were the real commanding 
officers. Their presence and influence made it possible that a large part of military life 
was occupied by political activities. For instance, the Communist Party used the military 
forces as an instrument of socialization of the youth generation. Undoubtedly, the armed 
forces mirrored the state. 
The process of politicization was augmented by powerful techniques of control 
and manipulation. The armed forces did not escape the control of the ‘Securitate,’ the 
Romanian political police. The military corps was infiltrated with covert informers. Thus, 
cohesion within the military suffered. In addition, the ‘Securitate’ had under its command 
special military forces, the top trained and equipped units. The officers of these units 
were the product of the Army officer schools.  
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As regards the Romanian case, it is worth mentioning that during the 1960s, 
Nicolae Ceausescu, at that time Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian 
Communist Party and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces received the rank of 
Major-General. Also important to be mentioned here are the paramilitary units 
established during the communist regime (so-called “Patriotic Guards”) and the 
participation of the active duty officers, alongside students, the agricultural activities or 
infrastructure projects, which all demonetized the idea of “military professionalism.”104 
However, the phenomenon of politicization, and the attached challenges involved 
in it in the early 1990s, during the first generations of defense reform, was not so 
dramatic in Romania, in comparison with other countries in the region. That was 
primarily because even during the communist regime, the country enjoyed a relative 
autonomy of the influence exercised by Moscow and Warsaw Pact arrangements.105 
Another way of diluting the cohesion of the officer corps and the role of the 
professional army was the creation of ‘Patriotic Guards,’ paramilitary units placed under 
the direct control of Romanian Communist Party’s Central Committee. The fact that 
these units consisting of factory workers, peasants and students were trained by army 
officers also contributed to the division of the officer corps. Consequently, all the 
methods, mentioned by Huntington, in which military power can be reduced, were 
employed by the Romanian dictator to control the armed forces. 
In contrast to subjective civilian control, the ‘objective control’ model is based on 
the maximization of military professionalism, as argued by Watts:  
 
 
                                                 
104 Rudolf Joo, “The Democratic Control of Armed Forces,” Chaillot Paper 23, Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies of Western European Union, (February 1996), 31, 57. www.iss-eu.org, (accessed August 
13, 2006). 
105 Larry L. Watts. “Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control 
vs. Democratic Control”. Journal of Political & Military Sociology 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002). 
 43
More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between the 
military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of 
professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer 
corps.106  
Before December 1989 the majority of CEE countries, including Romania, were 
caught in the paradigm of an “authoritarian party-state system,” that promoted ‘subjective 
civilian control’ over the military and a “limited professionalism,” as Ionel Nicu Sava 
underlines, following the pivotal work of Huntington107 and Janowitz.108 
Through ‘professionalization’ of the military, objective civilian control may be 
achieved, under particular conditions such as sound legal provisions, strong political 
leadership, professional military, and supportive military culture, inter alia.109 Whether 
these conditions were validated by the Romanian case in the aftermath of the 1989 
Revolution will be further addressed below.  
There are scholars who argue that during the communist period, the Romanian 
military was a professional army,110 as it presented the characteristics attached to that, 
such as expertise, responsibility and corporateness. On the contrary, in the last years of 
the dictatorship, the de-professionalization of the military was accelerated through the 
involvement of the armed forces in agricultural work and the megalomaniac national 
projects such as the Danube – Black Sea Channel and the so-called House of the People. 
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But the argument that the military was under objective control cannot be 
reasonably made. Objective control presupposes that the military stay out of the political 
sphere that is to be an autonomous institution. This basic requirement was not 
accomplished in communist Romania. There were two cases of flagrant mixture between 
the military and the Communist Party. First, as previously mentioned, the political 
commissars were infiltrated in the armed forces. Second, a number of flag officers were 
present in the party boards. Therefore, this interconnection between the military and 
politics made the existence of an objective control almost impossible.  
Understandably, during the Cold War era, for the majority of these states the 
‘post-modern’ model, consisting of “all all-volunteer forces, smaller armed formations, 
flexible, fully interoperable, highly mobile and state-of-the-art equipped” – as described 
by Moskos and promoted by liberal democracies of the West – was unimaginable.111 
Strongly related to the above, was the issue of the politicization of military 
structures in all CEE countries, before 1989. As argued by Andrew Cottey in Chapter I of 
a pivotal book on civil-military relations in post-communist Europe, published by the 
Geneva DCAF, “the military was highly politicized, in the sense that it was closely tied 
to the ruling Communist Party, and substantial efforts were made to embed communist 
political values and institutions within the armed forces.” 112  
After 1989, the transition process to democracy brought along the transition from 
subjective civilian control of the military to objective control. This process was a long-
lasting one, and many scholars would argue that it has not yet ended. However, the 
admission of Romania to the North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO), which implied 
principally the reform of armed forces and legislation regarding the security sector, could  
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indicate that this transitional process has in fact come to an end. Nonetheless, no one 
could claim that the civil-military relations in Romania have achieved an ideal stage of 
objective civilian control.     
The transitional process from ‘subjective control’ to ‘objective civilian control’ 
started with the de-politicization of the military, continued with the reform of the 
Constitution and the legislation and reached an end by achieving an acceptable level of 
professionalization. The de-politicization of the armed forces occurred relatively rapidly, 
due to at least two reasons. First, the Communist Party disappeared immediately from the 
political scene and, at the same time, the military positions of political commissars were 
wiped out from military structures. Second, after the violent ethnic clashes that occurred 
in March 1990 opposing the Hungarian minority to the Romanian majority and the 
Romanian state, the armed forces have not been employed by the political leadership in 
solving internal crises.  
The second step, which is instrumental to objective civilian control, was the 
building of sound legal provisions. The basic foundations for ‘democratic civilian 
control’ of the armed forces are rooted in the Constitution adopted in December 1991. 
But what does it mean ‘democratic civilian control’? In the Strategy Paper 2001-2004 
(Business Plan), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 
explains the term ‘democratic’ as “civilian and parliamentary control of the security 
sector” (including armed forces, paramilitary forces, police and other internal security 
structures, border guards, intelligence community).113 On the other hand, Professor 
Harold Trinkunas in his book makes the distinction between Huntington’s ‘objective 
control of armed forces’ and the ‘democratic civilian control,’ arguing that the essential 
component of the later is “institutionalized oversight of military activities by civilian 
government agencies.” However, he concludes that “civilian control of the armed forces 
exists when elected officials or their political appointees have authority to decide the 
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resources, administration, and roles of the armed forces.” Is this something else then 
making the military a “tool of the state”?114 
The following period in Romania saw the adoption of laws and governmental 
decisions that regulate the foundation, organization and functioning of various military 
bodies, as well as Romania's international military relations and participation in 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and peacekeeping missions. This period ended in 2003 with 
the revision of the Constitution, which made possible integration into both NATO and the 
European Union. 
According to the Constitution, the armed forces, as part of the executive power, 
are placed under the direct control of Parliament, the President, the government, the 
Defense Minister – who is a civilian – and the Supreme Court of Justice. The control 
exercised by these authorities primarily consists of the approval by the Parliament and the 
government of the framework documents concerning defense activities, such as the 
National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, and the programs of constitution, 
modernization and preparation of forces, as well as the defense budget as part of the state 
budget. Concurrently, the empowered public authorities oversee whether resources 
allocated to the army are used in compliance with the approved programs, which will be 
addressed in more detail in the following chapter.  
In addition to these public authorities that represent the classical power structures 
in the state, the armed forces are also subject to the direct control of the Supreme Council 
of National Defense (known by its Romanian abbreviation CSAT), the Constitutional 
Court and the Court of Audit. The Constitution gives to the President the right to act as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as well as Chairman of CSAT, so that he 
becomes the key player in national security matters. These prerogatives assure the 
necessary framework for the President to exercise a strong political leadership over the 
defense and security matters. 
Radical changes occurred regarding the transition from the mass armies that 
existed during the Cold War in all the countries of the communist block to the 
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professional armed forces. At the beginning of the 1990s, all the former Warsaw Pact 
countries were facing similar challenges: a massive army – which in the case of Romania 
numbered some 320,000 soldiers, tailored to respond to the megalomaniac ambitions 
attached to the military doctrine promoting the “war of the entire people,”115 though 
poorly trained and equipped.116 The fact that a clear, centralized inventory of resources 
available (that is people, distribution by ranks, but also equipment, infrastructure and real 
estate assets) has placed a heavy burden on the first years of restructuring and 
downsizing. 
The process of professionalization started in an unpromising manner but was 
corrected under Western pressures to reform the armed forces in order to facilitate 
integration into the western military alliances. The beginning was marked by the lack of 
initiative of political decision-makers. This led to a reaction within the military and a 
group of active and reserve officers formed the basis of an atypical organization, the 
Action Committee for Democratization of the Army (known by its Romanian 
abbreviation CADA).  Among the main requests of this organization, the following 
occupied a central place: promotion on the basis of merit and the retirement of the 
officers who supported the former regime. CADA could be seen as an extreme form of 
civilianization of the military, therefore it didn’t enjoy a prolonged existence in the 
Romanian post-Decembrist history.  
In 1994 Romania was the first country to adhere to the PfP program. Since then, 
both the decision-makers and the armed forces started to think in western-like patterns. 
The new roles and missions such as participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations have attached new dimensions to the professionalization development. The 
process reached a culmination point when a Romanian battalion was accepted to 
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participate ‘shoulder by shoulder’ with American forces in the Enduring Freedom 
operation in Afghanistan. The participation of Romanian units in stabilization and 
reconstruction Operation Iraqi Freedom came as a matter-of-course.   
Foster, Edmunds and Cottey define professionalization as “a set process whereby 
armed forces become closer to the ideal type of professional military.”117 Conceivably, 
the Romanian armed forces are still far from this ideal type, however, they are heading in 
the right direction. 
The supportive civic culture represents another important dimension in achieving 
objective civil control.  In Romania, the military enjoys a broad public support and in the 
majority of surveys, the armed forces occupy the second place in the hierarchy of 
respected institutions, following the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the reduced 
number of NGOs and, more important, the absence of think-tanks with expertise in the 
defense sector represent the weak link in achieving objective control. However, by means 
of the Romanian National Defense College, the awareness of defense issues among 
government officials, politicians, parliamentarian experts and media has been 
significantly increased in recent years.  
In sum, if an analysis of Romanian civil-military relations in communist Romania 
is to be done based on Huntington’s theory, only the constitutional form of subjective 
control would be appropriate. During the transition to democracy, objective civil control 
over the armed forces has started to crystallize.   
2. The Typology of Desch: Internal and External Security Environment 
Nevertheless, the major shifts that occurred in Romanian civil-military relations 
in the aftermath of the Cold War were due to changing international and regional security 
arrangements, and the attached risks and threats challenging the national defense. 
Consequent adjustments at the level of the roles and missions, structural changes and 
policy developments were consequences of these new conditions.  
An interesting argument according to which internal and external threats affect 
civil-military relations has been developed by Michael Desch. According to the author, 
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by measuring the perception of the threat, both internal and external, four situations may 
occur: (1) low internal threat and low external threat, (2) high internal threat and high 
external threat, (3) low internal and high external threat, and (4) high internal and low 
external threat.118  
The straightforward situations of civil-military relations to analyze are those in 
which one of the threats is high and the other is low: civil-military relations are either 
good or bad. A level of uncertainty and subjective appraisal exists when both internal and 
external threats are either high or low. It depends on how we answer questions such as 
those which are posed by the author, whose perception (of the military, government or 
society) and how different players are affected by this perception. 
A threat affects the entire political-military and social spectrum of a country. 
Thus, the three opposing players are the state (its institutions), the society and the 
military. Desch argues that an internal threat that does not affect the military will 
probably not affect civil-military relations. When the military is affected by internal 
threat, then it is willing to intervene in policy. 
Three situations may be distinguished when the military feels threatened: (1) 
when it is threatened by both the state and the society, (2) when the state threatens both 
the society and the military, and (3) when the society threatens both the state and the 
military. The end results of the above are described by Desch as follows. First, when the 
military is threatened by the society and state institutions, the conflict is likely to end with 
the military in power. Second, when the state is the “public enemy no. 1,” it is likely that 
the intervention of the military in politics changes the government with a different 
civilian leadership. Third, the case in which the society threatens both the military and the 
state could lead to a coalition between the military and the state and in the worst case to 
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When explaining the external threat, Desch puts it straightforwardly: “External 
threats have certain effects: they threaten the entire state, including the military; they 
usually produce increased unity within the state; and they focus everyone’s attention 
outward.”119 
It is arguable that external threats affect the three players – state, society and 
military – in the same manner. It is true that when the state and military intelligence 
agencies are relatively transparent (as they should be in democratic regimes), the society 
adopts the same positions as the state or the military. However, in non-democratic 
regimes, depending on the information available, each actor will build its own “map of 
threats;” thus, it will perceive the external threat in its own way.120 
Internal and external threats have been considered during the former regime and 
they influenced to some degree the civil-military relations. The Romanian Communist 
Party strictly controlled the military through political commissars and the ‘Securitate,’ 
thus the probability of a military coup-d’état remained low. Society did not perceive the 
military as a threat since the principal repression apparatus of the state was the 
‘Securitate’ and its riot control forces.121 Therefore, as in the case of all totalitarian 
states, the state represented a threat to the society and the military.  
The perception of an external threat, mainly after the Soviet invasion in 
Czechoslovakia, increased the role and importance of the defense issues on the party 
agenda but did not contribute to a change in the civil-military relations. As Daniel Nelson 
states, “the military policies of the Ceausescu regime turned towards a strategy of 
national defense modeled after Yugoslavia.”122 The strategy, based on a “war of entire  
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people,” reduced the sway of the Romanian Army in accomplishing its fundamental 
mission – the defense of the country. This fact automatically triggered the diminishing of 
the resources of the armed forces.  
In the transition period, things are more complex. The internal clashes arise 
mainly between the people and the government. Therefore, the first question that arises is 
whether the armed forces are used in maintaining the internal security order.   
After 1989, for about two years, the internal environment that Romania faced was 
characterized by numerous strikes and demonstrations against the new authorities 
because of the socio-economic situation of the country. In addition, the ethnic clashes 
erupted and the legal framework was unclear. Again, the source of the threat to the 
military and society was represented by the state. Even though Desch affirms that in this 
situation a military coup is more likely to occur, Romanian armed forces understood the 
democratic game and did not intervene in politics. However, as Desch’s structural theory 
predicts in the case of “a state facing low external and high internal threats,”123 the 
civilian control of the military was weak. 
Things started to change after the 1992 elections, when the general situation of the 
country became more stable. The new Constitution had been approved by a referendum 
creating a more stable legislative framework. In addition, the reform of the armed forces 
and the legislative framework regarding the national security were paramount in 
accomplishing the national objective, meaning the Euro-Atlantic integration. This shift in 
national priorities generated a change in civil-military relations in general, and civil 
control in particular, making them evolve from ‘worst’ to ‘mixed.’  
The new international security environment after September 11 has had a 
considerable influence on Romanian civil-military relations. The participation of 
Romanian battalions, first in Afghanistan in the Enduring Freedom operation and 
afterwards in Iraq has brought a major contribution to the improvement of civil-military 
relations. Even though the deployment of Romanian troops outside the country and the 
engagement in military operations was not caused by an imminent external threat, the 
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demonstrated professionalism and the appreciation of NATO counterparts triggered an 
increased level of trust by the political class and society in the competence of the 
military. For instance, a military leader, who played a crucial role in the rescue of three 
Romanian journalists hijacked in Iraq, has become the presidential advisor for security 
matters and there are chances to become the chief in charge of the long-awaited and 
debated intelligence community.  
To summarize, the professionalism of the military and the common goal of 
civilian and military institutions regarding national security affairs have driven to a 
significant improvement in civil-military relations and to a new type of civilian control. 
Furthermore, the ties between the military and society at large witnessed a major 
development. This phenomena became visible with the unconditional support expressed 
by the Romanian population not only in regards to the NATO accession process, but also 
to sending troops to theatres of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which was not a 
common feature of the countries in CEE region. 
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY 
Another issue of interest when it comes to analyzing civil-military relations is the 
relationship between the military and society. While common patterns may be observed 
when analyzing the developments seen in countries in CEE, national specificities can be 
underlined in the case of Romania as well. As Caparini put it in 2003,  
The post-communist states… shared a common experience under 
communism that continues to affect the polities and societies to this day. 
The members of this sub-region have also been influenced in their military 
and political reform by Western actors and processes, including NATO 
and EU enlargement.124 
In the case of Romania, the Army’s participation in the December 1989 
Revolution on the side of the population brought about a good relationship between the 
military and society, a high level of credibility of the armed forces and trust among the 
population: throughout sixteen years of democracy, the military ranked the second in the 
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opinion polls, after the church. Unlike the Latin American post-authoritarian regimes, the 
perception of the military in CEE countries, including Romania, was not that of a danger, 
and no praetorian trends existed, while “the record of the Romanian military is fairly 
healthy and supportive of civilian control,” as argued by Ioan Mircea Pascu, former 
Minister of Defense (2000-2004).125 
Another set of consistent evidence regarding the high credibility and trust that the 
Romanian armed forces enjoy in relationship with citizens refers to the perception of the 
“strategic objectives” represented by NATO and the EU membership, as both 
organizations declared that democratic control of the military is a precondition for 
accession.126 
According to the most recent opinion polls administered by the Centre of Urban 
Regional Sociology (CURS), the Romanian population above 18 years of age has the 
highest level of trust in institutions with traditional authority: the Church (80-85%) is 
followed by the Armed Forces (70%-77%), and mass-media (60%-63%).127 For instance, 
the public support for NATO integration reached an impressive figure of 85% among the 
Romanian population, while throughout different generations of reforms, and the political 
support expressed an unequivocal cross-party support for NATO membership.128 
There is not much evidence of a link between the European Union candidacy and 
civil-military relations, although some studies attempt to address this issue.129 According 
to the opinion polls regarding the future EU accession and the impact of EU membership 
on security and defense, the majority of respondents indicated as “the main advantage for 
Romania in case of EU accession” the increase of living standard (15%), the 
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abandonment of visas and free circulation in EU (10%), while only 1% of respondents 
believe that “national security and defense” would improve as a result of joining the 
European Union.130 
D. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In a series of two articles published in the NATO Review in late 1996 and early 
1997, Chris Donnelly, the NATO Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs 
analyzed the difficulties of “creating effective armed forces within a democracy and 
market economy” in the countries of the region.131  Both articles build on relevant 
theories on civil-military relations and military professionalism, such as those promoted 
by Huntington and Janowitz. Beyond a thorough analysis of the difficulties seen by the 
countries in the region in regards to defense reform and civil-military relations in the 
post-Cold War era, the articles make consistent proposals regarding a possible strategy to 
address the issues. Many of them refer to concrete ways of improving civilian control, 
defense efficiency and military effectiveness, while taking into account the specific 
challenges posed by the legacies of communist regimes.132  
In the first article, the author addresses the issue of efficiency in defense 
spending, and the issue of cost-effectiveness of national defense in the context of new 
geo-strategic situation of the post-Cold-War era. Getting the best value of public money 
becomes an imperative that diminishes the gap between old and new democracies of  
 
 
Europe. As a result of “the diminishing differences in cost-effectiveness of different 
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national forces,” the author observes that “'Fat' armed forces have become leaner, costs 
have evened out.”133 
In an attempt to draw on patterns regarding the national differences in costs, 
Donnelly proposes two models: a) Model 1 is “a force which is designed only for home 
defense, with a tiny professional cadre and mass mobilization” (which is reminiscent of 
the “mass armies” of communist Central and Eastern Europe) and b) Model 2 – “where 
the army is based on a permanent volunteer force, trained and equipped to accomplish a 
wide variety of tasks, from high intensity combat to peacekeeping and internal security 
tasks around the globe” (the all-volunteer force embraced by the majority of new NATO 
member states, including Romania).  
The author acknowledges the pain of defense reform in young democracies of 
CEE, on their rocky road to transition towards Model 2. Unlike the NATO states whose 
model they try to follow, the pain of the restructuring process in CEE countries is even 
higher, given the economic situation (scarcity of resources) and the inability of the state 
to provide appropriate social measures to redundant military personnel, such as adequate 
compensation packages, or second-career opportunities. As Donnelly argues, among the 
common challenges are the following:  
All must now face the dilemma of reassessing national security 
requirements and creating structures to manage them; of ensuring an 
adequate defense budget to build a sovereign army; of deciding how to go 
quickly from the mass Soviet-style army to one which reflects truly 
national requirements; and of explaining to their populations the changed 
nature of this new military animal and its relationship with society.134  
Beyond the challenges they represent, and irrespective of the model embraced, the 
above were addressed almost without exception by the defense reform initiatives of CEE 
countries, as “A country without effective armed forces cannot either assure its 
sovereignty or make the necessary contribution to an alliance.”135 Going further, the 
                                                 




author concludes the study by offering concrete policy recommendations that clearly 
remind us of the dimensions of the civil-military relations trinity. 
In the second article, published in the first issue of the NATO Review of 1997, 
Chris Donnelly attempts to draw on a framework for tackling the “defense transformation 
in the new democracies.” The author builds on the positive aspects involved by the 
external pressures exercised by NATO allies to help partner countries in their efforts to 
reform the defense and security sectors. Acknowledging the “dramas and tensions 
resulting from the restructuring, reform and downsizing which confront the national 
armed forces themselves,” Donnelly argues that “establishing effective management of 
defense and security policies” is an issue that is “just being recognized” at the beginning 
of 1997.136 
As the author recommends, reforming the framework of defense and security 
requires a “total reassessment of their national security requirements,” as well as 
“developing new mechanisms and procedures for elaborating national security policy and 
for crisis management, a major restructuring and downsizing of the military system, a 
reorientation of the officer corps and of the military philosophy generally, and a far-
reaching reform of the military-industrial procurement and production system.”137  
The author does not believe in ready-made recipes. Very much the contrary: in his 
view, the national democratic ownership of drafting and implementing defense reform 
and the National Security Strategy are of great importance. Beyond some elements of 
advice, experience and know-how, “No external agency, individual or institution can 
provide an answer,” as Donnelly argues. Acknowledging the legacies of communism, 
with “a permanently semi-mobilized state” and the corollary supra-dimensional army, 
Chris Donnelly recommends a radical shift of military philosophy, given the fact that the 
army’s “entire basis for operation and even existence has been changed fundamentally.” 
 In Donnelly’s words, ‘defense reform,’ covers restructuring the armed forces so 
that they reflect the need for defending an independent state and the reorientation of 
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military psychology to come to terms with operating in a democracy. Furthermore, 
defense reform “requires not just technical restructuring but changes in attitudes within 
the armed forces, as well as better communication among the various actors involved.”138 
Both articles draw attention to the objectives of defense reform and restructuring 
in the countries of CEE, the complex circumstances in which they were implemented, 
and the challenges facing policy-makers involved in the above. Building on the concrete 
experiences of the countries in the region and lessons learnt during the difficult transition 
process good governance and sustainable development, the work of Chris Donnelly is of 
critical importance for the study of defense reform. 
E. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the countries in the CEE region faced similar challenges regarding 
the inherited patterns of civil-military relations. These refer to the Soviet-style ‘mass 
armies,’ based on the conscription system, and the military doctrine that promoted the 
‘war of the entire people,’ a debatable professionalism of the armed forces, with its 
corollary regarding the politicization of the military. The issues of defense efficiency and 
effectiveness were almost ignored during the dictatorship. 
Both theories that were applied to analyze the state of civil-military relations – 
Huntington’s theory of civilian-control and the structural theory of civil-military relations 
of Desch – provided us with useful information for a systematic understanding of the 
roots of civil-military relations and the relationship between the military and society at 
large. Moreover, Desch’s theory is particularly useful, given the new security 
environment, as it adds a new dimension, the international one, to the classical attempts 
to understand civil-military relations.  
Donnelly’s contribution provides an extremely valuable framework for analysis of 
the defense transformation process in the countries of CEE. According to the author, 
analyzing the context in which the changes in defense and security occur has a major role 
in helping us to analyze further developments regarding the reform and restructuring 
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process, the legislative changes operated to enforce them, and the difficulties encountered 
when implementing the ambitious reform objectives regarding various aspects entrenched 
in civil-military relations. 
Such evidence proves to be essential for a better understanding of the complex 
challenges to be addressed by Romania’s defense reform, as well as for further evaluation 
of the national authorities’ progress with civil-military relations after the Revolution of 
December 1989. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: ROMANIA’S DEFENSE REFORMS AND 
PROGRESS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE THE 
DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION  
A. ROMANIA’S DEFENSE REFORM SINCE THE 1989 REVOLUTION 
Taking into account the purpose and the sequential approach of the thesis, a 
functional periodization of Romania’s defense reform since the 1989 Revolution is 
useful. In this respect, after an introductory sub-chapter that addresses the legacies of 
communism and Romania’s specificity among the CEE countries, my approach to the 
stages of reform proposes a split of major trends into three generations of defense reform, 
as follows.  
The ‘first generation of defense reform’ will cover the most difficult period of 
Romania’s transition, between the December 1989 Revolution, with the corresponding 
regime change, and the ‘cold shower’139 represented by the Madrid Summit of 1997, 
when Romania did not qualify for NATO accession.  
The period between 1998 and the Presidential elections in December 2000 is ‘the 
second generation of defense reform,’ when “Easterners and Westerners alike became 
more aware not only of the progress made, but also of the work ahead,” as Sava 
argues.140 In addition, some of the lessons learned from the first wave of NATO 
enlargement and the implementation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
demonstrated the necessity for more committed efforts to demonstrate credibility and 
interoperability for future accession to NATO. Unfortunately, the laggard political 
leaders did nothing in line with the awareness expressed by military experts to implement 
the painful defense reform, as this was the only way to regain credibility and support for 
NATO membership. The ‘third generation of defense reform,’ that started in 2004, 
currently on-going, builds on the most spectacular developments seen by Romania’s 
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defense reform. Essential laws and internal policy documents have been implemented 
during this period, and the progresses culminated with Romania’s accession to the North-
Atlantic Alliance in the second wave of enlargement, then with integration into the 
European Union, in January 2007.  
The chapter concludes with some remarks regarding the different focuses, 
objectives and triggers for defense reform throughout the three generations of reforms. 
As many important programs are on-going challenges facing the Romanian MoD, the 
political class and military command, these will be also addressed.  
Such programs brought about the basic democratic principles of democratic 
control, accountability, transparency, parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny 
exercised by civil society over the defense budget and expenditures, all of them being 
addressed by the thesis at hand when discussing their presence throughout the three 
generations of defense reform and civil-military relations. Furthermore, these were the 
dominant patterns for redefining security assistance after the Cold War, which followed 
three paths, according to Sava: aid-for-development, aid-for-reform and aid-for-
integration.141  
The decisive role of Western assistance in promoting and supporting the design 
and implementation of defense reform will be emphasized.  
As argued by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster in the Introductory chapter of their 
book of 2002, the “democratic control of the military requires a number of more specific 
elements for it to be effective,” as follows: a) an apolitical military, b) a clear chain of 
command for the armed forces, c) a civilian minister of defense, d) the subordination of 
the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense, and e) a degree of transparency with regard 
to the defense budget.142 
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1. ‘First Generation of Defense Reform’ (between the Revolution of 
December 1989 and the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997) 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, along with the end of mass armies, special 
attention was given to the democratization of CEE, and the attached “critical security 
sector reform goal” of establishing mechanisms for democratic control of armed forces. 
Most of the Western assistance was absorbed into this process.  
During the early 1990s, Western assistance and support was channeled towards 
building institutional capacity and good governance, re-establishing state institutions’ 
legitimacy and setting up the basic framework of democratic principles, to include the 
rule of law, transparency, and accountability, alongside more quantifiable objectives, 
such as downsizing and restructuring of the state’s apparatus, including the military 
organization, under the circumstances of severe economic constraints and need for 
prioritizing the objectives of defense reform. It is worth mentioning that during this 
period, donor agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) played a crucial role in driving the public administration reforms and related 
assistance, through the mechanisms of conditionalities attached to structural adjustment 
programs, while other security and defense institutions, such as the NATO, OSCE, and 
European Union exercised a limited influence. Understandably, they would come to play 
a more important role only in the later years of the first generation of defense reform, 
through the mechanisms provided by the Partnership for Peace arrangements starting in 
1994, and the forthcoming PARP and MAP instruments, using the incentive of 
enlargement and defense reviews as triggers for defense reform, stimulated by means of 
the training programs, know-how transfer, and in-house assistance provided by foreign 
advisors.  
An interesting attempt by a group of military professionals to break with the 
peaceful but sluggish transformation and democratization of the army took place in the 
early 1990s, and this has been addressed by authors like Nestor Ratesh and Tom 
Gallagher. In his 1991 book dedicated to the Romanian Revolution of 1989, Ratesh 
briefly addresses the Romanian army’s democratization movement during 1990. 
According to the author, the Committee for Action to Democratize the Army (CADA), 
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created shortly after the Revolution (in February 1990), was banned after the mid-June 
1990 violence of the coal miners who came to Bucharest to force the change of the 
government, when the CADA was blamed for the army’s inaction in the face of political 
violence.143 The issue was later considered by Tom Gallagher, who argued that the 
CADA was founded “by reform-minded officers who wished for a decisive rather than a 
cosmetic break with the past.”144  According to Gallagher, the role of the Romanian 
Armed Forces in the political and military circumstances of the early 1990s may be 
briefly presented as follows: the opposition was weak and divided, the democratic checks 
and balances were absent, and there was an intense competition for limited state 
resources. On this background, the role of the armed forces was radically reconsidered, as 
it was expected to fill a political vacuum left by the collapse of civilian authorities.145 
This may explain the overwhelming focus on democratic civilian control over the armed 
forces during the first generations of defense reform, and the focus of Western assistance 
on projects to enhance civilian control, to the detriment of efficiency and effectiveness, 
the other two pillars of the civil-military relations trinity, as presented by Bruneau and 
Trinkunas.146 
As noted by Gogolewska when analyzing the developments of Polish defense 
reform and civil-military relations, “NATO and other Western observers promoted a 
model of civilian control that focused on a civilian minister of defense and promoting 
military socialization to democracy.”147 
Despite clear delimitations between the responsibilities of the bureaucracy 
represented by the MoD and the General Staff, in practice the sharing between strategic 
policy-making and operations’ command did not enjoy a smooth relationship. Like in the 
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case of Hungary, where the main issue to be solved regarding civil-military relations 
during 1989-2001 was “the difficult clarification of civil and military responsibilities 
concerning command and control of the military,” or “the integration of the ministry and 
the General Staff” as Ferenc Molnar148 argues, Romania’s attempts to draw a line 
between the responsibilities of the administrative, bureaucratic apparatus empowered 
with key decision-making regarding the national defense policy, legal harmonization and 
procurement, and its civilian leadership on the one hand, and the General Staff, on the 
other hand proved to be extremely delicate. Arguably, this is an issue that even long-
established democracies still have to deal with, as it brings about the distribution of roles 
between the MoD (defense planning, guidance and know-how transfer regarding 
legislative harmonization, human resources, finance and accountability) and strategic and 
operations’ command exercised by the chief of General Staff, and most probably a final 
resolution in this respect will be a long-term goal.  
But the issues of roles and missions assigned to the armed forces, and the 
distribution of responsibilities between the MoD and the General Staff during crisis 
management operations or peace-support operations raises serious concerns regarding the 
issue of effectiveness. That is because, as observed by Thomas Bruneau and Harold 
Trinkunas, there is a series of factors that justify the interdependence between defining 
and implementing the set of roles and missions to be performed by the armed forces, and 
military effectiveness, among which the following appear to be the most important: a) the 
wide variety of roles and missions; b) the fact that “roles and missions cannot be 
effectively achieved without resources, to include money, equipment and training”; c) 
inter-agency cooperation is needed; d) the roles and missions “viewed in the context of 
coalitions and alliances,” as the authors argue.149 
Constitutional and legal reforms were critical at this point, as they established the 
new roles and missions of the security and defense institutions, putting them on a liberal 
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democratic basis, where the rule of law and the clear separation of powers prevailed, as 
argued by Biljana Valkovska. However, Douglas Bland goes further and draws attention 
to the different, still interdependent levels of analysis to be considered when addressing 
the issue of “a shared responsibility” in liberal democracies. Thus, according to the 
author, “In most states, four central decision matrices drive defense policy and 
management: strategic (set of decisions about means and ends of defense), organizational 
(decisions about arrangements of defense resources and internal responsibilities), social 
(decisions about armed forces and society) and operational (decisions about the 
employment of forces).150 
However, democratic control and civilian oversight over the armed forces cannot 
be limited to legal and constitutional settlements. As argued by Born, Haltiner and 
Malešic in the introductory chapter of a book of 2004, the essence of this period can be 
summarized as follows: “armed forces are being reduced and restructured, as well as 
military missions and priorities are being redefined,”151 while the need to internationalize 
the issue of democratic control of the armed forces is a must.152 
As regards Romania, a major restructuring was made during this period, as the 
missions of the armed forces abandoned the concept of the “mass armies” and territorial 
defense of 1989 to a more flexible and affordable army, which was cut in 1997 to about a 
half of its initial military strength, reaching a peacetime active force of 163,523 soldiers, 
of which 76,345 were conscripts.153 
But severe restructuring and downsizing were not ends in themselves. As stressed 
out by Chris Smith, based on the review of the World Development Report of 1997, “size 
is irrelevant when judged against effectiveness.” Then, the author continues by stressing 
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that “Reform rather than downsizing was thus the primary requisite guiding the 
transformation of the state… in post-communist European nations,” while the two state 
reform strategies as follows: a) matching states’ activities with capabilities (financial, 
human and technological resources) – in the short run; and b) improving state’s 
capabilities through reforms of public institutions – in the long term.154  
Following Schmitter’s approach to civil-military relations, with the two 
assumptions to enforce it – “keeping the military out of politics” and “keeping civilian 
authorities from drawing the military into politics,” and Donnelly’s argument155 that by 
embracing it, the governments of CEE isolated military commands (General Staff) from 
civilian (political) leaders, Larry Watts156 argues that the Western model, focusing on 
civilian control has proven to be “counterproductive and superfluous” when adopted by 
the countries of CEE. Thus, according to Watts, approaching civil-military relations in a 
static manner is among the pathologies of Western civilian control over the military, 
which brings about “formal indicators” – and superficial, one could argue – to measure 
civilian control, such as the number of civilians appointed within the Defense Ministries. 
While civilians’ presence in leadership positions is visible proof and is easily measurable, 
these may also hide more profound deductions regarding the real “ability of civilians to 
exercise that control.”157  
Watts goes further and argues that Romania presents a special case in this respect, 
as the national authorities refused to align themselves to this trend that encourages the 
appointment of civilian inexpert appointees, who “exerted virtually no control over the 
military.” Thus, while the country enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from Moscow 
during communism, Romania, the critiques for its resistance to appoint civilians lacking 
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military training and highly competent, also observed by Joo,158 turned out to be later 
appreciated, as this reticence prevented the country from “overt politicization, and 
civilian micromanagement” and brought about “retaining efficiency and keeping the 
military out of political infighting.”159  
Given the above, a review of key constitutional and legal arrangements, but also 
critical institutions created to enforce them may prove valuable at this point.  
The first Constitution of Romania was approved in 1991, and came into force in 
1992, framing the essential arrangements for a clear separation of powers, defining the 
roles and missions of the armed forces and state authorities in the new security context, 
and setting the principles of civilian control and oversight, through the defense 
commissions that were established at the level of the Parliament and the Executive. A 
good overview of the constitutional and legal prescriptions regarding the Romanian 
Armed Force in the semi-presidential regime is provided by Marian Zulean, in an article 
published in spring of 2004.160 The Constitution of 1991 was changed by Referendum in 
2003, and changes to the initial document addressed crucial issues for future NATO 
accession. Thus, the modifications were made to eliminate technical/legal limitations for 
future NATO membership and to prepare the end of the conscription system in favor of 
an all-volunteer force. One of the key legal requirements for future NATO membership 
regards the adequate constitutional and legal provisions on the participation to collective 
defence operations. Thus, as stipulated by Article 118 of the revised Romanian 
Constitution of 2003, “the foreign troops can enter, station or transit the territory of our 
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Romania,” while “the Romanian Armed Forces may contribute to collective defence 
within military alliances and can participate in operations to maintain and re-establish 
peace.”161 
Other key institutions were set up during this period, and a significant number of 
legislative packages accompanied the reforms efforts. Thus, the National Supreme 
Defense Council was established by Law 39/1990, further modified by Law 415/2002. As 
stated by Larry Watts, “The CSAT is the most important locus of security reform and 
defense planning, bringing together all executive authority in Romania’s semi-
presidential system where the presidency is primarily responsible for national security 
and foreign policy and the Prime Minister for domestic administration.”162 
Also important during this period is the elaboration and implementation of the 
basic laws regulating the national defense of Romania (Law 45/1994 of the National 
Defense of Romania), or the successive legal arrangements regarding the Organization 
and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense: Law 41/1990, Emergency 
Ordinance 74/2000, Law 389/2001 for the approval of Emergency Ordinance of the 
Government 14/2001 on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National 
Defense (the latter being modified this year by the Law 346/2006). But leaving aside the 
minor change in name of the institution (from “Ministry of National Defense” to 
“Ministry of Defense”) the Law 346/2006, currently applicable, does not propose many 
or radical changes regarding the organization of central structures, under the direct 
subordination of the Minister of Defense, and even lesser changes have been operated on 
the key responsibilities/attributes of central structures and the reporting flows. As regards 
the following organizational charts to be implemented, these are still in the process of 
being drafted by the Romanian Ministry of Defense. 
During the transition, international organizations such as NATO, the European 
Union and the OSCE played a critical role in supporting, advising and directing 
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Romania’s reform efforts towards the establishment of democratic political control over 
the military and norms on democratic civil-military relations. The adoption of the OSCE 
Code of Conduct and NATO’s PfP framework proved essential in this respect. To a large 
extend, Romania’s accession to NATO was partly possible because of the participation in 
exercises as a member of the NATO PfP program, since its launching in 1994. Also, the 
tools promoted within the PfP framework – such as IPAP, PAP-DIB (Partnership Action 
Plan on Defense Institution Building), PARP (Partnership for Peace Planning and Review 
Process and PAP-T (Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism) – had a decisive 
contribution to the country’s preparedness to join the North-Atlantic Alliance. Among 
them, the PARP made NATO’s extensive experience in defense planning and the 
interoperability criteria of the Alliance available to the partners, and encouraged their 
involvement in the decision-making and planning processes. Such tools contributed 
significantly to their preparation for accession, through the periodic review of the level 
reached in achieving the Interoperability Objectives, (further Partnership Goals - PGs), 
mutually agreed by the representatives of NATO and the partners.163  
When establishing the priorities of defense reform during the 1990s, the 
Romanian authorities found themselves between external conditionality and the need for 
internal credibility and commitment. A series of USAID and EU-PHARE projects were 
launched, to shape and implement primarily public administration reforms and a Civil 
Service Law no. 188, which was adopted only in late 1999, ten years after the December 
1989 Revolution. 164 
Due to political instability and lack of internal commitment and realism when 
establishing the objectives of reforms, rather “cosmetic changes” were pursued during 
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abandoned, as the ambitious objectives that were set rather to satisfy the pressures 
exercised by foreign advisors than based on a realistic assessment of the competing 
priorities of the MoD.  
Only in 1994, later than her CEE neighbors, Romania appointed a civilian 
Defense Minister: Gheorghe Tinca, a diplomat by education and experience.  
Overall, Romania had not embarked upon convincing progress during the early 
1990s, partly because of a lack of political will and commitment, or because of limited 
know-how transfer, and this was made clear during the Madrid Summit in 1997, when 
Romania’s hopes for NATO accession were rebuffed. This period also represents the 
beginning of the professionalization of the armed forces, and a decisive contribution in 
this respect were the joint exercises organized under the PfP auspices, but also the 
Western assistance provided through the means of training abroad or in-country seminars, 
and the know-how transfer promoted through the foreign advisors.  
The Romanian MoD faced a serious reorganization only in May 1997, with 
changes that affected both central structures and combat forces. Coincidentally or not, 
also in 1997, the Human Resources Management Directorate was established, by merging 
the former Personnel Directorate and Military Education and Training Directorate.  
A radical shift of vision and strategy was implemented, alongside the newly-
introduced Concept of Human Resource Management, which put on new basis the 
professionalization of the armed forces, recruitment and selection, military career and 
training.  
In this stage of reforms, a strong relationship between the NATO enlargement 
process and the progress with democratic civil-military relations and broader military 
reforms in the ten countries to join NATO in 2004 could be observed.165 As a political 
and military alliance, NATO played a decisive role both in “promoting and consolidating 
civilian control of the armed forces” and in “setting the agenda for structural reforms 
 
164 Civil Service Law 188/1999, (Bucharest: Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 600, Dec.8, 
1999).  
165 Timothy, Edmunds, “NATO and its New Members,” Survival Vol. 45, no. 3 (September 1, 2003), 
145-65. 
 70
across the military organizations.”166 According to Timothy Edmunds, NATO’s influence 
was strongly connected to the enlargement agenda, and that was possible under four 
circumstances, as follows: a) to tie the incentive of membership to reform; b) technical 
assistance and advice, as NATO was a pool of experience and expertise, to be shared 
with the partners through the means of NATO-sponsored seminars, conferences, and 
multinational military exercises; c) effective and transparent mechanisms for defense 
planning and budgeting were implemented; and d) the propagation and reinforcement of 
democratic norms of behavior. 167 
To sum up, one could assert that the first generation reforms were politically 
related, and that NATO’s influence was still limited. Among the common problems that 
challenged the transitional democracies of the region, the following are the most 
important, according to some scholars: a) the absence of information on the armed forces 
and defense spending, b) a poor analysis of defense policy choices, c) unrealistic 
assessments to match available resources to ambitious objectives and alternative defense 
policy options, and d) bureaucracies that were unwilling and unable to implement policy 
decisions.168  
In 1995, NATO’s Study of Enlargement made it clear that democratic civilian 
control requires more than “maximization of civil power”: it includes “effective 
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2. ‘Second Generation of Defense Reform’ (between the Disappointment 
of NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 and the Successful NATO 
Accession in April 2004) 
As observed during the first and second generations of defense reform, preparing 
for NATO membership was a way to speed up the reform process not only of the military 
organization, but of the entire Romanian society. Proving continuity, responsibility and 
credibility were the overarching guiding principles of the Romanian approach to NATO 
accession, but also constituted important political and military triggers for the defense 
reform process since the 1989 Revolution. Following the NATO Summit held in Madrid 
in 1997, the pace of defense reform, and their effectiveness increased significantly. That 
is because it brought about a more targeted and effective approach to defense reform, primarily 
designed to meet the NATO accession objectives. 
The radical shift seen in the defense policy doctrines during the 1990s, had to 
reflect, in turn, the new roles and missions of the armed forces, as argued by Maior and 
Matei in a study published in 2002. Accordingly, it appeared obvious that “For countries 
in Eastern Europe, finding appropriate balance between threats and capacities in planning 
the defense has been a challenging issue,”170 an issue that has been realized only during 
the latter stages of reforms. As stated by the authors of the study,  
The missions of the armed forces have been derived from four correlated 
defense policy objectives: integration in NATO and EU; finalizing the 
reform process in order to acquire modern, flexible and sustainable 
defense capabilities; developing the mechanisms for civil and democratic 
oversight; and improving Romania’s status as a security provider through 
maintaining and increasing its contribution to regional stability.171 
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According to the new planning provisions, starting with 1997, a number of force 
reviews were done,172 adjusting the armed forces composition, which are structured on: 
a) Active Forces – which include a package of capabilities designed for participation in 
Article 5-type missions – for immediate and rapid reaction; b) Territorial Forces (with 
low- reaction capabilities); and c) Reserve Forces.173 This allocation of forces proved to 
be the optimal one until integration into NATO, and the subsequent decision to abandon 
the conscription system in favor of an all-volunteer force, believed to result in additional 
effectiveness, which has been in place since January 2007.   
In 1999, on the occasion of the NATO Summit in Washington, the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) was launched as a tool to support countries aspiring to join NATO in 
their preparations through objective standards and benchmarking for their progress. 
Drawing extensively on the lessons learned during the accession process of the three 
countries to join NATO in the first wave of post-Cold War accessions (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland), the MAP cycles constitute a comprehensive 
benchmarking instrument for self-evaluation, and an extremely valuable tool for Romania 
to understand the standards promoted by the alliance, and to practice the military and 
political dialogue with the NATO representatives, prior to accession.174 
A more focused and field-specific Western support and assistance to Romania’s 
defense reform, as well as more efficient know-how transfer, especially from the NATO 
member states became visible during late 1990s. It consisted of training opportunities (in 
Romania or abroad), the assignment of foreign military instructors in military education 
and training institutions (such as the NCO Training Center in Pitesti, the elite NCOs for 
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the Land Forces; or the NATO PfP Training Center in Bucharest), or appointing of 
foreign advisors to high-level leadership. Key contributors in this respect were the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and many of them were 
concerned with the restructuring process, improving human resources management and 
professionalization of the armed forces.  
Beyond the external assistance that gained focus and substance, internally there 
was more commitment to regain NATO’s credibility, which sped up the adoption and 
implementation of somehow painful policies and legal framework, as we shall see. In 
regards to the progress seen by human resource management reforms, the downsizing of 
the military corps continued, even more decisively. Furthermore, active social measures 
were researched, in order to help the redundant military personnel to re-integrate in the 
business market. In this respect, the World Bank provided substantial loans for the re-
professionalization and post-career assistance of the retired military personnel; in total 
some $2 million.  
But the North-Atlantic Alliance itself learned some lessons throughout the 
enlargement process. During the first wave of enlargement, military matters were not 
given much importance, and the intervention of the NATO forces in Kosovo, with the 
poor performance of the three members (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) was a test 
in this respect. The lessons learned were successfully applied to the ten candidates to join 
the alliance in the second wave. As Timothy Edmunds states, rethinking the priorities of 
the defense reform, meaning the quality of personnel and equipment, and seeking ‘more 
deployable,’ flexible forces with a high readiness to fulfill a new mission, were among 
the essential indicators of defense progress.175 The necessity to balance the economic 
constraints on defense spending with the necessity of participation in NATO missions 
had positive implications for re-thinking the objectives of reforms and the strategies to be 
employed in order to achieve them. Related to that, the critique of ‘two-tier’ armed forces 
may appear justified. It refers to an excessive focus on elite units, to the neglect of the 
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bulk of the armed forces, which remain “conscript-based, under-resourced and largely 
unreformed,” as argued by Edmunds.176  
3. “Third Generation” of Defense Reform (From 2004 to Present) 
If the issue of civilian democratic control dominated the discourse of defense 
reform throughout the 1990s, a new impetus began with a new political class that came to 
power with the elections in late 2000.  
Starting in 2001, major steps forward were made regarding the implementation of 
the United States’ planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) and regarding 
the Objective Force and of the military through an adequate career system and Selection 
Boards for military promotions. The first successes were also achieved regarding the 
modernization of equipment, procurement, as well as in the field of privatizing inefficient 
defense industries, previously heavily subsidized, or being provided contracts despite the 
debatable quality of their products.  
Among the many pieces of legislation adopted, the following are the most 
important from the viewpoint of democratic principles of good governance, 
accountability and transparency: the Law 544/2001 on free access to information in the 
public interest and the Law 42/2004 on the participation of the armed forces in missions 
abroad.  
In his speech on the occasion of the appointment of Teodor Atanasiu, the Minister 
of Defense, President Basescu stated that: “We have a reality – the [Romanian] Armed 
Forces is ahead of the country itself from the viewpoint of modernization. I can assure 
you that the politics of the Romanian President is to always keep the armed forces one 
step ahead, because the military organization is one of the moral pillars of the Romanian 
nation, alongside the Church.”177 
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During this stage of reforms, major policy and strategy documents have been 
adopted to mirror the challenges raised by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the obligations 
that derived from the new status Romania gained in the North-Atlantic Alliance. Among 
these, the White Paper of Security and National Defense (2004), the National Security 
Strategy (last revised in 2006), and The Military Transformation Strategy (2006), which 
has as its goal “to build up a modern, completely professionalized structure more mobile, 
efficient, flexible, deployable and sustainable having the capability to be engaged in a 
wide spectrum of missions in a joint manner.” In achieving its goal, the Military 
Transformation Strategy of 2006 proposed three ambitious stages: (a) finalizing the basic 
restructuring (2006-2007), (b) operational integration into NATO and the EU (2008-
2015), and (c) technical integration into NATO and the EU (2015-2025).178 
But beyond recognizing the more decisive defense reform of CEE countries 
starting with the mid-1990s, the governments’ approaches to change and transformation 
were not free of criticism. While acknowledging that defense reform in the region 
generally focused on “further reductions in the overall size of armed forces and the 
development of forces capable of contributing to peace-support operations,” a NATO 
Review published in late 2002 stressed the negative impact these efforts had on 
developing the “two-tier” militaries to which Edmunds also refers.179 Thus, the authors 
of the review drew attention to the divide between “elite cadres capable of operating 
alongside NATO Allies and the conscript-based bulk of the armed forces whose 
operational effectiveness is degrading.”180   
Most modernization and training efforts were directed at enhancing the 
capabilities of units made available to the Alliance in accordance with the Force Goal 
requirements for different years. Under these circumstances, “less glamorous aspects of 
defense policy such as training, operations and maintenance, and communications 
equipment” were postponed, many of them for January 2007, when the conscription 
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system was abandoned in favor of full professionalization of the Romanian army and the 
adoption of an all-volunteer force system.181 
During 2005-2006 more than 2,000 Romanian troops were deployed abroad – in 
the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq – to conduct operations under NATO, EU or UN 
command or as a part of the Coalition of the Willing. According to the number of troops 
involved to date, “Romania ranks seventh among the nations participating in the Global 
War on Terrorism.” as stipulated in the “Romanian Defense” brochure of 2006.182 A 
detailed account of the Romanian contribution with troops in theatre of peace-support 
operations is presented on the website of the Romanian MoD. 183 
B. REVISITING ROMANIA’S DEFENSE REFORMS: FIELD-RELATED 
EFFORTS IN REGARDS TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
1. The Implementation of the PPBS (Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System) in the Romanian Mod 
In reviewing how political oversight is exercised over the armed forces, ensuring 
democratic mechanisms for transparency and accountability, or military effectiveness and 
defense efficiency, one cannot escape some references to how defense planning and 
budgeting is implemented and reviewed.184 
The adoption of the American-proposed PPBS (planning, programming, 
budgeting and evaluation system) as an integrated defense planning and auditing tool 
under direct control of a civilian minister is also important, as a mechanism to ensure 
democratic civilian control over the Romanian Armed Forces, increased efficiency in 
resource allocation and expert oversight regarding the defense expenditures.  
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Romania applied the PPBS in 2001, the same year when the Defense Integrated 
Planning Directorate was established and placed under civilian defense leadership (the 
State Secretary for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department). Until then, 
as in the case of Poland and Hungary, the planning and allocation of resources was the 
responsibility of J5/General Staff. The integrated planning and budgeting is regulated by 
the Defense Planning Directive, a key policy document that is updated annually, and 
consists of eight major programs which are run by program managers, as follows: Army, 
Air Force, Navy, Logistic Support, Strategic Command, Defense Intelligence, Central 
Administration and Pensions, and International Relations. Being founded on Force 
Projection and the need to adapt the military organization to the new Force Goals (FGs), 
the Defense Planning Directive is submitted to the Romanian Minister of Defense for 
approval, after it has been discussed in the Defense Planning Committee. It is one of the 
essential tools that enhance transparency, external auditing and oversight of the defense 
expenditures.185 
The Romanian defense budget since 2000 fluctuated around 2% of GDP, with 
peaks in 2002 and 2004. But even when the defense budget reached a higher percentage 
of GDP (i.e., 2.45 percent of the GDP in 2002) in real figures it represented just under $1 
billion, while supporting active armed forces of 103,000.186  
During the negotiations and reviews in light of the future membership in 2004, 
Romania committed itself to allocating 2.38% of GDP to defense, until 2008. However, 
due to conflicting priorities, the debate around Romania’s inability to fulfill its 
commitments to the Alliance and the European Union is an on-going issue among 
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lower than the percent promised to NATO, and both President Traian Basescu and Eugen 
Badalan, then the Chief of General Staff, have pleaded for an increase, though without 
much success.187  
As regards the defense budget for 2007, the draft Law on State Budget for 2007 
was approved by the commissions on budget-finance in early November, without major 
changes to the draft proposed by the Romanian Government. However, one of the most 
important changes consisted in increasing the funds allocated to the Defense Ministry 
with some 841 millions ROL, a sum to be spent on modernizing the Armed Forces 
equipment and infrastructure. In the draft budget, established by the Ministry of Public 
Finance, the MoD was given 6.797 millions ROL, representing 1,78% of the GDP. 
Compared with 2006, the net increase was 148.8 million ROL, a budget that “gives no 
chance to the armed forces [to perform their missions],” as President Basescu has put it, 
in a speech delivered in October last year, on the occasion of appointing Sorin 
Frunzaverde, the current Minister of Defense. Supplementing the draft allocation appears 
to be a must, to allow Romania to accomplish its commitments to NATO and the EU, to 
participate with troops in peace-support operations and implement the newly adopted full 
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2. A New Strategic Vision Regarding Mod’s Human Resource 
Management 
Maybe the most radical innovations in the Romanian military organization 
regards the progress made in the field of human resource management, as it is inter-
connected to issues such as force restructuring and professionalization of the armed 
forces and civil-military relations, but also interoperability and readiness. Some of the 
elements of the new policies and strategies can be summarized as follows: a new, 
motivating and transparent career management system, based on the pyramid-like model 
of ranks system, matching positions with ranks, recruitment and selection (Selection 
Boards), a new ratio between active duty commissioned officers and NCOs. 
As stated in a review of Romania’s defense recently published by the Ministry of 
Defense, “Building a professional military is a multilateral process fully integrated in the 
general restructuring and modernization of the Romanian Armed Forces,” while the on-
going goals of the Romanian armed forces is “To shape a flexible and efficient 
professional force, based on voluntary contract enlisted personnel.”189 
A key piece of legislation on achieving the full professionalization of the 
Romanian Armed Forces, which includes provisions regarding the military personnel and 
their career path, rights and obligations, or sanctions is the Law 80/1995 on the 
professional statute of military personnel.  
One of the reasons for the difficulties encountered in reforming the human 
resource management system is that it represents both “an instrument and a vehicle for 
reforms,” as pointed out by Maior and Huluban.190 Following the argument of Anthony 
Forster in his paper presented at a workshop organized by Geneva Centre for the 
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Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2000,191 Maior and Huluban emphasize 
the similitude between “hardware versus software” reforms and their timeframe. Thus, if 
the first generation reforms address basic institutional issues, and the attached issues 
(drafting and approval of basic constitutional and legislative framework, structures and 
the allocation of clear lines of responsibility), the on-going reform process is focused on 
long-term arrangements to empower principles of good governance, organizational 
effectiveness and efficiency – meaning the functioning and performance-related goals of 
the defense institution, procedures and change in attitudes. In this context, they underline 
the transition made by the Romanian MoD from an ‘empirical’ approach to Ministry of 
Defense personnel administration during the early 1990s, to a scientific approach towards 
a modern system of human resources management.192  
To support their argument, the authors draw on the concrete effort made by 
Romania on its way to NATO membership. Thus, in February 2001, on the occasion of a 
“profound and pragmatic review of the national accession plan, they observed that three 
out of the twelve priorities (Partnership Goals – PGs) considered vital for re-establishing 
credibility for NATO candidacy were related to human resources management and 
professional soldiers’ career paths. The Military Career Guide, enacted since 2001 and 
the implementation of the Selection Boards for officer’s promotions in higher ranks were 
seen as decisive in Romania’s defense reform.193  
Improving civilian management was also considered among the priorities of 
human resources management reforms, and both quantitative and qualitative objectives 
have been set up in this respect, by the newly established Human Resource Management 
Directorate in 1997.  
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In terms of gross figures, the civilian corps employed by the Romanian Ministry 
of Defense, including the three categories of forces and the General Staff, faced a 
dramatic reduction, from some 40,000 civilians in 1989, mainly employed in 
administrative and support activities, to approximately 17,000 in 2006. A further 
reduction is envisaged, to reach the Objective Force of 15,000 by the end of 2007.  
But even more radical changes have been implemented in terms of qualitative 
restructuring of civilian personnel, based on the guiding principle stated in 1998, and 
approved by the MoD leadership, according to which  
Any job from within the MoD that could be performed by a civilian will 
be occupied by a civilian. Thus, civilians will be the experts, advisers, 
highly qualified administrative officers in all defense activities that do not 
necessarily require military training and experience, or the managers of 
such structures.194 
On this basis, apart from the four civilians who are political appointees (the 
minister of defense, and the three state secretaries and chiefs running the defense 
departments – Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Legislative 
Harmonization, Public Relations and the Relation with Parliament and the Procurement 
Department), there are currently some 300 managers within the Romanian Ministry of 
Defense and its agencies, and the recruitment of civil servants and defense contractors 
with high academic qualifications and relevant work experience to occupy leadership and 
counseling posts is further encouraged.  
Some of the advantages of their employment by the military organization can be 
summarized as follows: a) civilian experts and leaders bring a different perspective – a  
more managerial approach; b) if used in those fields of expertise that do not require 
military training and experience, they can be a more efficient, effective and competitive 
workforce; c) they are cheaper to employ in comparison with their military counterparts, 
as they have a pay band similar to their military colleagues (while the MoD does not 
invest in their training and equipment); and d) the costs associated with their potential 
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restructuring/downsizing is smaller compared to the active social measures of protection 
and compensation package paid to the military personnel.  
As regards the continuous efforts to improve civil-military relations, Larry Watts 
recommends focusing on the relationship between civilian leaders (both politically 
appointed and defense managers) and military commanders, and this relationship should 
be based on “civil-military discussion, collaboration, and consensus-building,” all of 
them achievable through joint task-forces and common training programs, as most of 
those provided by Western assistance.195  
3. Modernization of Military Equipment and the Defense Procurement 
Reforms 
The defense procurement for the Romanian Armed Forces is carried out by the 
Procurement/Acquisition Department, run by a civilian-appointed State Secretary. 
However, major procurement programs are approved by the CSAT. These focus on three 
major aims, as follows: “the modernization of the existing weapons-systems and military 
equipment according to NATO standards,” “the acquisition of some categories of 
weaponry which are either non-existent or not efficient,” and “the acquisition of 
Romanian-made weapons systems and the assimilation of foreign technology for their 
production,” as Ioan Mircea Pascu claims. 196  
Taking into account that the principal tasks of military acquisition and property 
management (APM)197 are “to acquire, invest in, and manage the critical equipment, 
weapons systems and technologies necessary for current needs and future operations,” 
due to the economic constraints the modernization of equipment and procurement was 
always delayed during the first generation of defense reform, while “APM reform was 
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central to NATO integration because effective joint operations require standardized and 
interoperable military technologies.” Beyond bringing about other inter-dependent 
sectorial reforms, among which institutional capacity-building, integrated planning and 
budgeting, or democratic control, the procurement reforms in the Romanian MOD always 
posed serious challenges to the civilian and military leaders. This is because, as Larry 
Watts has put it, “Although procurement and supply plays such a major role in the 
modernization and alliance integration process, they rarely constitute early priorities of 
military reforms because of the immense sums of money involved.”198 
The main modernization programs that the Romanian military is embarked upon 
focus on communications and information systems, air space management and logistics. 
An increased focus was placed on implementing the Air Surveillance Operational Centre 
(ASOC) and the Armed Forces Communications System.  
As regards the value added by the ten new members to the strength of the North-
Atlantic Alliance – at that moment only candidates to NATO enlargement – the analysis 
proposed in 2002 by a group of NATO analysts revealed serious critiques regarding the 
decisions, in 1999, to modernize the Romanian Armed Forces by the acquisition of the 
American Bell 96 Cobra AH-1 attack helicopters. Decisions to cancel the agreement were 
eventually made, as a “result of understanding that beyond the symbolic gesture, the costs 
would be barely supported by the country’s budget.”199 
In 2006, a key strategy document was issued regarding the field of procurement. 
The paper, called “The Endowment Conception with Major Equipment and Systems of 
the Romanian Military 2006-2025,” is in line with the major defense planning and 
strategy documents in force (such as the Act 473/2004 on Defense Planning, the Defense 
Planning Directive White Book on Defense, the National Security Strategy, or the 
Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy). Understandably, the Endowment 
Conception of 2006 is designed to fulfill the Force Goals (FGs) and engagements made in 
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line with Romania’s contributions with forces and capabilities to NATO Response Force 
(NRF), and Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) and the commitments made to the 
European Union. As stipulated in the document, as much as 85% of the military 
equipment is currently outdated, as most equipment is manufactured with the technology 
of the 1970s. Among the short term and medium term objectives stated in 2006 for the 
following two decades, according to the Concept, there is the development of integrated 
capabilities to become operational by different categories and services and branches and 
in different timeframes, including those of reconnaissance, surveillance and control 
systems of the airspace within the NATINEADS system.200 
For the purpose of demonstrating the difficulties in major procurement and 
modernization programs with regard to the issues of democratic control, efficiency and 
effectiveness, but also with the harsh public scrutiny and oversight they are exposed to, 
two main examples might prove relevant.  
The first case refers to the contract for acquisition of two second-hand multi-role 
frigates type 22, signed by the Romanian Government and military officials with the 
British Royal Navy, for the sum of £116 million in late 2004, which raised many 
concerns regarding the efficiency of this investment. Regarding the costs associated with 
the modernization of the two frigates for combat and escort capabilities, these represents 
some EUR 600 million for their technological update at a medium level, and some EUR 30 
million annually to keep them functional, according to the assessment of journalists. 201  
A second and more recent debatable decision refers to Romania’s negotiations for 
the acquisition of seven medium-sized transport aircraft, equipped with a complete self-
protection system to allow them to carry out inter-theatre missions in all operational 
scenarios under maximum security conditions. While the Romanian authorities, 
represented by Ioan Ion, the State Secretary and Chief of the Procurement Department, 
argue that the offer made by the Italian company ALENIA Aeronautica (seven C-27J 
                                                 
200 See “The Endowment Conception with major equipment and systems of the Romanian Military 
2006-2025”, elaborated by the Procurement Department of the Romanian MoD, 
http://www.dpa.ro/engleza/documente/Endowmentconception.pdf, (accessed Dec. 2006). 
201 “Seful statului ar putea refuza promulgarea Legii bugetului 2006” [The President could refuse the 
promulgation of the Law on the state budget for 2006], Gandul newspaper, (Nov. 7, 2005). 
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aircrafts that are worth a total of around EUR 220 million) was the only one that met the 
technical requirements (as recommended by ROMTEHNICA SA, National Company), 
there are voices that claim that during the negotiations the competitor (the Spanish 
company EADS-CASA, that offered its C-295 transport aircraft) was disadvantaged. In 
the end, the solution adopted by the Romanian Armed Forces appears to be “the worst 
and the more expensive (as it costs some EUR 12 million more) among the two,” as 
argued by Radu Tudor, a Romanian correspondent to Jane’s Defense in Bucharest.202 
C. CONCLUSION 
Following the evidence presented in the chapter on military reform in a book 
published in 2002 by the Romanian Ministry of Public Information,203 some of the 
characteristics of Romanian military reform throughout the rocky road of transition to 
democracy can be summarized as follows. First, a continuity of military reforms can be 
observed: a process that started in 1990 and followed several stages of defense reform – 
with radical shifts regarding objectives to be attained, enjoyed strong political and public 
support, despite the painful restructuring it brought about. Second, defense reform was 
also focused: “the main goal of the Romanian Armed Forces process is to develop a 
robust, leaner, flexible, NATO interoperable and affordable force that can be easily 
deployed and sustained in theatre.” Among the key areas that were addressed, 
irrespective of the stage of the reforms, the following are of pivotal importance:  force 
restructuring and readiness, defense planning, human resource management, and the 
modernization of the armed forces, which included the implementation of systems such 
as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and Air 
Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC). Third, Romania’s reforms were results-oriented, 
which allowed for successful implementation of initiatives designed not only to achieve 
NATO-membership, seen as a “top priority,” but also for overarching objectives to 
improve the defense efficiency and military effectiveness. In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning the “aggressive” approach of Romania to achieving the NATO Partnership 
                                                 
202 Jurnalul TVR [News - Romanian TV broadcasting], December 6, 2006, 19.00 hours. 
203 Romania on its way to NATO, (Bucharest: Ministry of Public Information, 2002), 51-61. 
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Goals (PGs) during 2000-2002, when twenty-five PGs were completed, while another 57 
PGs were planned for the period 2003-2007, with a clear calendar for each. The progress 
seen in implementing the PPBS system, and the dramatic changes in human resource 
management,204 are only a few of the examples of the achievements that recommend 
Romania’s efforts as a successful example in tackling the challenges raised by defense 
reform. 
Romania’s progress with defense reform and civil-military relations can be 
evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. In quantitative terms, the Romanian 
Armed Forces suffered a severe downsizing: with a population of some twenty-three 
million, Romania renounced a mass army and an over-dimensioned structure of about 
300,000 soldiers (with the potential to mobilize up to 900,000), tailored according to the 
military doctrine of the Cold War era, in favor of a “modern, completely professionalized 
force structure, more efficient, flexible, deployable and sustainable, having the capability 
to be engaged in a wide spectrum of missions in a joint manner,”205 with a strength of 
some 90,000 (of whom 75,000 active duty, fully professionalized, and 15,000 civilians). 
With a defense budget of $2.3 billion in 2006, and a target of 2.38% of the GDP to be 
allocated annually to defense (as promised to the North-Atlantic Alliance during the 
negotiations for accession in 2004), with more than 2,000 soldiers currently deployed for 
peace-support operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, Romania successfully 
participates in NATO and EU operations, ranking seventh among nations participating in 
the Global War on Terrorism.206 
As regards the qualitative transformations seen by the security and defense sector, 
the challenges and changes were even more dramatic. The changes in missions to address 
the new threats and asymmetric risks, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons 
of mass-destruction are accurately mirrored by the last security and defense documents, 
such as the White Paper for Security and Defense (2004), the National Security Strategy 
                                                 
204 Romania on its way to NATO, (Bucharest: Ministry of Public Information, 2002), 55-6. 
205 See Military Transformation Strategy of 2006, elaborated by the Romanian General Staff. 
206 See “Romanian Defence” booklet, published by the Romanian MoD Public Relations Directorate, 
Military Publishing House, available on-line at http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/Romanian%20defence.pdf, 
(accessed October 2006).  
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(2006), the Military Transformation Strategy (2006). Furthermore, as the thesis 
demonstrates, the steps forward made by the military organization in policy-making and 
the implementation of reforms regarding the planning and budgeting, the human resource 
management, or military modernization programs all prove that the external triggers for 
defense reform have been happily met by internal political willingness and technical 
efforts made by the MOD and General Staff together to demonstrate Romania’s potential 
as a reliable security and defense provider in the Alliance. The abandonment of the 
conscription system, in favor of an all-volunteer force, starting with January 2007 is 
another valid indicator of Romania’s commitment to defense reform.207 
 
                                                 
207 Law no. 395 from 16 December 2005 on the delay of compulsory military service in peace time 
and passing to voluntary based military service. The Official Gazette of Romania, Part I no. 1155, 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis is an overview of Romania’s approach to defense reform since the 
December 1989 Revolution. Special attention is paid to the dimensions of the civil-
military relations trinity, as proposed by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas in their 
recent research. The analysis reviews the key objectives of defense reform throughout 
different stages of transition until today, and inquires how the Romanian policy makers 
framed and implemented civilian control over the armed forces, as well as the 
imperatives associated with defense efficiency and military effectiveness.  
The first section of the thesis proposes conceptual clarifications regarding 
theoretical approaches to defense reform and military transformation, as approached by 
consolidated democracies and patterns followed by the political and military authorities 
of young democracies that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the aftermath 
of the Cold War. Arguably, the roles and missions to be performed by the military 
bureaucracy and the armed forces in the CEE region faced dramatic changes, given the 
change of the regime, and the dramatic shifts in the nature of risks and threats to national 
defense and security in the late 1980s. The profound transformations that occurred in the 
management of social, political, and administrative affairs of the nations had a profound 
impact on the military institution and the functions it was asked to perform under the 
new, democratic circumstances.  
A framework of analysis is provided as a guide to civil-military relations. 
Acknowledging that the majority of studies dedicated to the issue almost exclusively 
address the themes associated with civilian democratic control over the armed forces, and 
ignore defense efficiency and military effectiveness, a brief review of the definitions 
proposed by classics in the science of management appears to be useful. Building on 
conceptual differences between the terms ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness,’ and on relevant 
scholarly contributions to ‘performance management’ in military organizations, as 
addressed by the defense reform initiatives in Western democracies, the thesis proposes a 
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series of qualitative and quantitative indicators that would further guide the analysis of 
the progress on the dimensions of  civil-military relations. 
The following section reviews the legacies of communism regarding civil-military 
relations (CMR) in the countries of CEE, with particular attention to Romania. The scope 
of the analysis is to provide a better understanding of the starting point of defense reform 
and the dramatic challenges facing civilian and military authorities during the early 1990s 
and after. Given the relevant indicators of democratic civilian control, defense efficiency 
and military effectiveness that were identified in the previous section, revisiting classical 
theories of CMR, as proposed by Samuel Huntington and Michael Desch provides a 
useful basis for applying the conceptual framework to the region. The relationship 
between the military and society during the communist regime is also addressed, as this 
deepens our understanding of the circumstances in which the defense reform initiatives of 
the new democracies of CEE occurred during the early 1990s. The section concludes by 
drawing on the approach proposed by Chris Donnelly in regards to the ambitious 
objectives posed by the defense transformation process in the Soviet-style armies of 
South-Eastern Europe during the early 1990s. The author builds on the challenges facing 
the defense systems in the region, among which are the massive downsizing and 
restructuring processes, the professionalization and de-politicization of the armed forces, 
and the pressures towards increasing defense efficiency and military effectiveness.  
All the above prepared the analysis of Romania’s defense reform, the case study 
that is proposed by the thesis in the following section. As the evidence provided by this 
chapter demonstrates, Romania made consistent progress regarding various aspects of 
civil-military relations, throughout sixteen years of transition to democracy and defense 
reform. Both the accession to NATO in 2004 and the recent integration into the European 
Union in January 2007 are concrete proofs in this respect.  
As the assessment demonstrates, on its rocky transition towards good governance, 
healthy civil-military relations, and the professionalization of the armed forces, Romania 
took full advantage of various forms of Western assistance. Among these there is the 
know-how transfer ensured by foreign advisors, training and education opportunities 
provided by the allies. However, as underlined by the study, the efforts made by national 
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stakeholders in the design and implementation of defense reform initiatives were decisive 
in achieving the ambitious objectives of defense reform, under the circumstances of ever 
shrinking defense budgets.  
The sequential approach proposed distinguishes between three generations of 
defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution.  
First, during the early 1990s, which coincides with the first generations of 
Romania’s defense reform, which lasted until the Madrid Summit of 1997, the agenda of 
security and defense reform focused on regaining the legitimate authority of state 
institutions, capacity building, downsizing and restructuring of the armed forces, and on 
setting up and enforcing the legislative framework for democratic civilian control over 
the armed forces. The de-politicization of the military structures and the inflow of civilian 
experts in non-combat activities were among the developments that occurred in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, and such phenomena characterized the majority of the CEE 
countries, including Romania. During the first generation of reforms the main 
contributors to defense reform were the financial institutions, such as the World Bank, 
the IMF and EU-PHARE, and all efforts were targeted towards democratization, 
institutional capacity-building, public administration reforms and restructuring, starting in 
the late 1990s. Especially since 2001, Western assistance gained consistency and 
effectiveness, through the means provided by NATO and the European Union, but also 
by bilateral assistance programs focusing on defense reform and Romania’s 
interoperability with the allies and accession to the above-mentioned institutions. Either 
the Western assistance consisted of training opportunities in-country and abroad, advising 
and know-how transfer in certain fields of expertise that were critical to the accession 
process (such as integrated planning and budgeting, human resource management and 
training development), and proved to be crucial for Romania’s progress on a rocky path 
of consolidating democracy.  
Gradually, with the second and third generations of defense reform, the 
‘managerial approach’ replaced the excessive emphasis on civilian control over the 
armed forces. Once the basic democratic principles such as civilian oversight over the 
military became a matter of routine and new strategies were implemented to enforce the 
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transparency and accountability of military planning and budgeting system, finding ways 
to increase the organizational efficiency of the defense institution and military 
effectiveness came to the forefront of the defense reform initiatives.  
Romania’s progress with defense reform and civil-military relations can be 
measured and evaluated using both qualitative and quantitative indicators recommended 
by the dimensions of civil-military relations, as the detailed analysis proposed by the 
section dedicated to the case study demonstrates.  
To summarize, using a one-to-five grading scale (1 being the minimum, and 5 the 
maximum), given the proposed framework of analysis, the assessment of the founding 
principles of democratic civilian control, military effectiveness and defense efficiency, on 
the one hand, and the progress in the Romanian military organization in particular fields 
of defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution, on the other, can be summarized 
as follows. 
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However, given the ongoing challenges facing both the young democracies of 
CEE and more mature and modern military bureaucracies, the process of defense reform 
and the achievement of full professionalization of the Armed Forces is still far from being 
accomplished. According to the reform and modernization plans, currently applicable, it 
is expected that in the near future more focus will be placed on achieving military 
effectiveness and defense efficiency, and it is expected that this will bring about both a 
reconsideration of the existing structural and functional arrangements, and massive 
investments in equipment modernization and procurement.  
Following the analysis, one can argue that a different focus has been placed 
during different generations of defense reform: during the first generation, the accent was 
put on the “hardware” aspects of reforms, such as severe restructuring, creating the legal 
framework for reforms, or putting into place mechanisms of civilian control, while lately, 
ongoing or “software” reforms like full professionalization, interoperability, ‘objective 
force,’ modernization and procurement of military equipment, performance management, 
privatization and contracting-out. The latter require a more sophisticated and difficult 
approach to defense reform and indicators for measuring military effectiveness and 
defense efficiency, that are to be found on the defense reform agenda on a medium and 
long run. These are issues to be considered equally by young democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, but also by the Western countries, themselves searching for new 
approaches to getting the most out of shrinking public money. In this respect, borrowing 
from the principles and practices that usually guide the management of private 
organizations, which are business-like and performance-oriented, seems to be an 
extremely valuable approach.   
Drawing on the evidence provided by the analysis and on the lessons learned 
during successive generations of defense reform, some of the issues to be considered by 
the Romanian policy-makers who oversee the implementation of on-going defense 
reform and prepare the agenda of the military transformation for the forthcoming period 
may be synthesized as follows.  
As the major trends in military transformation recommend, finding new ways to 
achieve more and better outcomes with less resources, be they people, money or 
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equipment, is essential. Given the increasingly austere budget allocations to defense and 
security, is it expected that in the years ahead the military organization will be required to 
embrace business-like approaches to planning and spending public money, and adjust the 
priorities of defense and security to the resources available. In this respect, applying the 
principles of performance management when tackling the ambitious objectives of defense 
reform and military transformation is a must, as the thesis exemplifies. 
Achieving the full professionalization of the armed forces is not a stand-alone 
guarantee for defense efficiency and military effectiveness. Similarly, the democratic 
control over the military is not an end in itself and it does not preclude the military from 
performing its functions inefficiently and ineffectively.  This is just a part of a dynamic 
process, that also requires massive ‘civilianization’ of the non-combat fields in the 
defense bureaucracy, privatizing defense industries, and contracting out, as all the above 
bring about substantial cost savings, if done in an effective, accountable and transparent 
manner.  
By making use of various assistance programs available, the long-established 
democracies that have modern armed forces can contribute substantially to the success of 
defense reform initiatives on which the countries of CEE are embarked. However, 
assuming the ownership of defense reform initiatives is essential for the long-term 
developments in the field. Without a realistic approach to the resources available to 
achieving the defense priorities, and without convincing effort to be paid by national 
political and military authorities in implementing the initiatives associated with healthy 
civil-military relations, all the desiderates of defense reform will remain wonderful paper 
plans, having no chance of ever being achieved.   
To conclude, the Romanian case may be considered successful in regards to 
defense reform and CMR. As the thesis demonstrates, consistent progress has been made 
regarding civilian control over the military, improving defense efficiency and military 
effectiveness. There is still much to be done, and the conditions under which the defense 
reform initiatives should be achieved are not the most encouraging, as the on-going 
initiatives aimed at transforming the Romanian Armed Forces reveal. However, taking  
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into account the latest developments and the standards raised by the interoperability with 
the NATO allies, and more recent EU membership, there are positive indicators regarding 
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